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THE SCOPE OF THE WORK

Groundwater relates to human demand upon it in several
ways. Increasing human demand, relative to groundwater, makes
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these relationships far more significant today then ever in the
recent past. Groundwater, like any mineral, supports the surface
of the earth, so that its withdrawal and the failure to replace it
can cause subsidence. Groundwater is important for drinking,
agriculture, and industry; and if it is withdrawn without regard
for its replenishment or if it is polluted in the ground, those
dependant upon that diminished or damaged groundwater suffer.
Groundwater's presence can hamper mining or construction projects, while dewatering these sites can harm both the resource
and those who have been drawing on the groundwater. Finally,
groundwater interfaces with surface water, so that bad things
that happen are not likely to be confined to either ground or
surface waters.
This paper deals with the way law and institutions need to
deal with groundwater under contemporary conditions. The
propositions of this paper concern the contemporary problems
posed by human demand on groundwater and the legal and
institutional processes that can be undertaken to deal with those
problems. The problems are presented first and then the difficulties of solving them follow.
The problems of groundwater in this paper are described in
terms that assert: (1) human demand upon groundwater should
be carried on so that either aquifers can naturally recharge or
else will be artificially recharged; (2) an integrated approach to
all water-surface and groundwater-must be pursued on the
part of law and institutions; (3) groundwater needs perhaps even
greater protection from pollution than does surface water since
groundwater purifies very slowly or not at all, even in the
presence of great human effort to assist in its purification; (4)
protection of groundwater from pollution is to be preferred,
consequently, to any policy of allowing pollution and then cleaning it up; (5) the supply function of withdrawn groundwater
must be considered in conjunction with groundwater's quality,
its ability to sustain the surface, and its role in holding back or
containing salt water intrusion; and (6) groundwater is not just
a physical presence for engineers to withdraw or protect but a
part of the economy, a support for society, and a renewing part
of the world's ecology.
The attempted solutions to these problems are reviewed in
this paper under assumptions that claim: (1) a purely physical
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engineering approach will not provide adequate protection to
groundwater as a resource; (2) command regulations confined
to such actions as limiting drilling, spacing wells, prohibiting
water export from its region of origin, or rationing water in
volume or use also will not provide adequate protection; (3)
groundwater must be considered not only in physical terms but
also in its economic and social roles, including the cost of
extracting, protecting, abusing, exhausting, interdicting, or replacing groundwater on the one hand and the benefits or harms
socially conferred by such actions on the other; (4) groundwater
ought not to be considered as a free good, perhaps not even to
the landowner under whose lands the groundwater lies; (5)
groundwater use ought not to be subsidized so as to make it
cheap to its users since this will skew the value the groundwater
has to such users; (6) groundwater concerns the power of the
sovereign and the moral attitude the sovereign takes toward both
renewable and exhaustible resources; and (7) neither the sovereign nor society's power and moral attitude necessarily are better
applied through command regulations designed to protect
groundwater than they are through readjustments in property
relationships concerning groundwater.
No industry is more involved than the mining industry with
groundwater and the difficulties of sustaining groundwater's
quality, quantity, movement, and general continued availability
as a resource for human use. For the mineral industry (which
includes the extraction of coal, oil and gas, ore, and aggregates),
the presence of groundwater can be a nuisance to be removed,
a resource to be used in mineral extraction, a substance to be
protected from pollution by mineral extraction and the disposal
of extraction wastes, and a necessity for the restoration of minerally exhausted sites. Continuously, the mineral industry is
required by legislative mandate to behave in particular ways
concerning groundwater and, as an industry, mining today cannot ignore the problems posed for it by groundwater nor the
possibilities that there may be more economic and successful
institutional ways to sustain the availability of groundwater than
simple legal prohibitions.
This paper draws upon a wider range of experience than that
of the mining industry, including agricultural irrigation, industrial cooling and dilution, residential, and other uses, as well as
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ways to rearrange property relationships among such users. But
many of these ideas are applicable to the mining industry; and,
in any event, knowledge of them offers potentially useful tools
to the mining industry. For this reason, despite this paper's not
being confined in its illustrations to the mineral industry, it still
ought to offer useful experience and ideas to that industry too.
These, at least, are its author's intentions.

II.

GROUNDWATER'S CONNECTIONS

The focus on groundwater withdrawals prior to the 1970s
was on protection of the aquifer from overpumping rather than
protection of it from pollutant incursion (e.g., salt water) or
protection of that surface land from subsidence. This has produced the view that:
the most important operational aspects of modern water resources management [are] catchment, apportionment, and use
of the resource . . . [A]ny legal approach to these aspects of
management must be understood as a concept that deals with
the form in which use will be permitted, the extent (in time,
place, and quantity) and the actual practice of the user. This
legal approach is a component of the wide concept of water
management, the final objective of which is to ensure the most
rational use of available water resources.'
In short, it is important to account for every drop pumped.
Groundwater has traditionally been exempted even from this
much concern on the part of governmental regulators as long as
the abstraction of water was used for domestic uses. This was
so even when domestic use was extended by definition to intlude
watering animals and providing for farm uses other than irrigation or the far broader purpose of municipal supply of drinking water. 2 But attending to the water pumped is by itself not

I Caponera, Co-ordinator's Introductory Speech, Results of the IV World Congress of the Int'l Water Resources Assoc. in 2 WATER FOR HumAN CONSUMPTION, MAN
AND HIS ENVIRONMENT, 67 (Maxwell ed. 1983) [hereinafter Results].
2 Burchi, Legislation on Domestic and Industrial Use of Water, 1 WATER AND
HUMAN CONSUmPTION, MAN AND His ENVIRONmENT 409 (Maxwell ed. 1982) [hereinafter
Legislation]. Latin American law gives municipal drinking water for domestic use top
priority. Id. at 411. Islamic law recognizes the Right of Thirst which permits persons to
water their household and animals even at another's water supply. Id. at 411-12. The
only limitation is "an obligation to refrain from wasting or misusing the resource," Id.
at 415.
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enough concern, though preferable to no governmental concern
at all.
Since the 1970s, however, governments have enlarged the
scope of their regulatory concern to include such matters as land
subsidence and harm to the groundwater both within and without aquifers.' Even aquifers not being drawn upon by pumping
have become subjects for governmental regulations.
Now, with regulatory legislation passed in the 1970s, groundwater quality regulation is under consideration ...

for con-

trolling pollution from sources such as land disposal of liquid,
solid, and hazardous waste; septic systems and cesspools; saltwater intrusion from groundwater depletion; and activities
sucnl as oil production, irrigation, accidental spills, and mining....

[Plrograms include underground injection control,

classification of groundwaters, landfill control, and well regulations .

.

. depend[ing] on the unique physical, economic,

4
and political factors involved.

Current interest in the United States at the state and federal
governmental levels, in the protection of aquifer integrity from
other uses and in the protection of land from subsidence by
water withdrawn from aquifers, indicates a broadening of governmental responsibility in regulating groundwater. No longer is
the concern merely with the rate of groundwater withdrawal or
with aquifer exhaustion.
The relations of the aquifer to surface waters, to substances
flowing into the aquifer, to aquifer function in holding back sea
encroachment or holding up surface lands have been recognized
as being as important as overpumping for use or overpumping
for dewatering to permit other resource exploitation. Once that
recognition occurred, legal regulation of some sort had to follow.
In 1986, the United States Environmental Protection Agency's
(USEPA) Office of Groundwater Protection required all USEPA
program officers to incorporate as "internal office routine"

I Id. at 411.
4 N. GREGG, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 281 (1985). (Iowa is proposing research

to change modern agricultural practice in order to protect groundwater quality). See 2
AM. LAND RESOURCES BULL. (Sept.-Oct. 1987).
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groundwater protection strategy into all their regulations, plans,
and actions.'
A distinction needs to be maintained between groundwater
generally and water confined in aquifers. Groundwater, of course,
is a larger concept than the water confined in an aquifer. Water
in transit to an aquifer or water saturated in near-surface clay
layers are not aquifer water. Yet the pumping of this groundwater outside an aquifer occasionally can be as harmful as
pumping that draws from within an aquifer and is adverse to its
stabilization abilities.
Aquifer water withdrawals create separate problems. For
example, pumping can reduce the artesian head of the water in
the aquifer (the lifting power naturally present), creating the
need for artificial pumping. The sediments within the aquifer
can become impacted by pumping that interdicts natural recharge, so that the aquifer loses some or all of its rechargeability
and ceases to be an aquifer. Water may still percolate through
the soil. Once the porosity of the aquifer has been lost, however,
no recharge will take place. Withdrawal of water faster than the
recharge rate, accompanied by failure to inject replacement water, can also cause ground subsidence, either across a wide plain
6
of land or by concentrated sink-holes.
Land subsidence caused by the extraction of groundwater is
similar to the subsidence caused by the withdrawal of gas and
oil. Most aquifers have an adequate natural recharge rate, if
pumping is related to this recharge rate. Unlike oil pools and
gas domes, aquifers enjoy replenishment by natural means. Aquifers also can be artificially replenished with various kinds of
waste water. 7 Through either recharge process, land subsidence
from water withdrawal could be avoided.
Injection of water into strata emptied of oil and gas for
storage would have a sustaining power that would prevent sub'

5 HYDATA No. 2, 2 (1986).
J. POLAND, L. CARBOONIN, & S. YAMAMOTO, Economic and Social Impacts and
Legal Considerations, in GUIDEBOOK TO STUDIES OF LAND SUBSIDENCE DUE TO GROUND
WATER WITHDRAwAL (Poland ed. 1984) (UNESCO Studies and Reports in Hydrology,
no. 40, 119, 122) [hereinafter Considerations].
6

' J. POLAND, L. CARBo NIN, & S. YAMAMOTO, Review of Methods to Control or

Arrest Subsidence, in

GUIDEBOOK

TO STUDIES OF LAND

SUBSIDENCE

WATER WITHDRAWAL 127 (Poland ed. 1984) [hereinafter Subsidence].

DUE TO GROUND
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sidence once oil or gas had been withdrawn. The stored water,
however, would risk pollution from unextracted hydrocarbon
remnants and might be lost to further human uses.
Most people think that artificial recharge is easily accomplished. But they are wrong. An aquifer that either is not recharging fast enough both to maintain pumping levels and protect
the aquifer's attributes, or an aquifer whose location lacks sufficient rainfall under contemporary weather conditions to supply
the water from nature that is needed for recharge, will be corrected as quickly as belipyers in the easy fix would have us
believe.
Many see artificial recharge as having only one major problem: aquifer contamination. That is a major danger. 8 But the
operation of recharging an aquifer artificially, assuming potability of the water being used for recharge (or the isolation of
the aquifer if contaminated water is being used or the already
brackish condition of the aquifer if salt water is being injected),
still poses its problems. This is true even if the repressuring of
confined aquifers by artificial recharge is the only way to slow
down or stop land subsidence or aquifer damage. Recharge water
ought to be treated-which, in the present state of the art,
cannot be done for water naturally recharging aquifers-in order
to prevent aquifer clogging and contamination. Treatment of the
recharge water, however, is only one among the several expensive
steps that must be taken if an aquifer has to be artificially
maintained. 9

I See e.g., 9 INT'L ENV'T REP. 175, 245-46 (1986). For example, the French had
refused, despite Dutch demands made persistently since 1946, to reduce the discharge of
salt into the Rhine. A commitment by France was made in the 1976 Convention for the
Protection of the Rhine to inject the salt as saline water into the ground. The salt is a
by-product of the potash mines in Alsace and the Alsatians politically have prevented
the injection program, though the French have promised a 1987 solution. Id. (Similar
examples of popular resistance to ground injection programs for waste liquids could be
replicated throughout the world. Nobody anywhere in the world loves a Love Canal.).
9 Subsidence, supra note 7, at 128.
mhe injection of ... [a] great quantity of water from diverse sources
[can] create many problems [that must be] controlled by various chemical
and physical treatments . . . [R]esults [of such experiments] were satisfactory when the water was clear; most of the problems of recharge through
wells involved clogging of the well[s] and aquifer ... [through] air entrainment, suspended particles in the recharge water, and micro-organisms ...

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

If artificial recharge is to be undertaken, how is it to be
done? If the aquifer is shallow and unconfined, near the surface
and covered by a permeable layer, water can be spread on the
land directly above the aquifer, and then allowed to percolate
downward in a recharge much like nature's. There is a problem,
however, if the confined aquifer is fairly deep, covered by relatively impermeable layers, recharged by percolation from a
distant land surface on which rain fell, or has had its content
provided in some previous geologic age without current prospect
of natural recharge. For these kinds of aquifers, injection wells
are necessary. The recharge water must be forced into the aquifer
in order to repressurize it. t°
Obviously, this latter practice demands energy, personnel,
machinery, water accumulation and movement, and the money
to provide each one of the necessities. Such an investment will
always be postponed until no other choice is possible, even at
the expense of relocating population from a region whose aquifers had been pumped dry and whose land had subsided.
Money to the desperate would then seem of little value.
Fortunately, there is some good news about aquifer recharge- "conjunctive" storage and water harvesting. These techniques are among advantages to be gained from an integrated
management of surface and groundwater. After all, surface and
groundwater both are subparts of a single hydrologic cycle."

[W]ater-treatment cost and contemplated use of the recharged water are
the principle factors involved in determining the economic feasibility of
artificial recharge. Id.
10See generally, W. GORDON, A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK ON GROUNDWATER PROTECTION, 10-11 (1984); M. JAFFE AND F. Di Novo, LOCAL GROUNDWATER PROTECTION, 13031 (1987).
1l N. GREENWOOD & J. EDWARDS, HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS AND NATURAL SYSTEMS,
9-18 (2d ed. 1979). See also, K. KRAUSKOPF, THE THIRD PLANET: AN INVITATION TO
GEOLOGY, 51-53, 62-67 (1974) (on the hydrologic cycle). Water harvesting has been
defined as "runoff . . . produced from specially landscaped or prepared surfaces . . .
or treated land surfaces ....
[that] depends on size, slope, soil and material properties,
and rainfall" that is then stored in reservoirs or by aquifer injection. Popkin, Increasing
Water Supply for Home Irrigation, 3 PROCEEDINGS, WATER REUSE SYMPosruM, 2068
(March 25-30, 1979). Conjunctive storage means the reuse of wastewater, control of
water seepage, evaporation control, vegetation management and protection from brackish
water incursion, disposal and water conservation as part of a program to safely reuse
water. Phillips, The Direct Reuse of Reclaimed Wastewater: Pro, Cons, and Alternatives,
60 J. AM. WATER WORKS Assoc. 231 (1974).
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Conjunctive water storage-or, for that matter, the total
issue of water management regardless of source-requires the
consideration of surface and groundwater impoundments together, with water being shifted from one to the other as wanted.
Water harvesting from the surface of the ground minimizes
evaporation. No programs of controlled ground water withdrawal, aquifer recharge, aquifer cleansing, the combatting of
salt-water intrusion, and decisions about selective water for mining can be fully implemented without a joint consideration of
both surface and groundwater. 2 At the very least, water is
accounted for, is not economically wasted, is efficiently engineered, and is employed so as to minimize environmental harm.
Policy-makers for many years have urged such joint consideration. A 1976 declaration of the International Conference on
Water Law and Administration speaks as well for this point of
view as any other.
[It] . . . urged governments to: integrate the management of
groundwater with all other available water resources, including,
for example, the employment, where practicable, of aquifers
for the seasonal storage of surface waters, and the creation or
improvement of groundwater recharge catchment areas to minimize losses of rainfall and to capture excess'surface run-off. 3
Putting aside the question of whether nature knows of any
"excess," the prophetic words here are "when practicable."
Practicability for conjunctive action has apparently turned out
to be a scarce condition.
Yet the idea remains a sound one that should be vigorously
pursued to implementation. Nature often supplies abundant rainfall when human enterprise does not need it. Such water should
be stored and, in the past, has been stored in surface reservoirs.
Surface reservoirs are subject to loss from evaporation and
require much ground when most suitable sites already have been

12

GREG,

supra note 4, at 281.

11 L. TECLAFF, Declaration of February 14, 1976, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL

220 (1985). In 1973 the United States National Water Commission also had
"provided detailed recommendations on the integration of ground and surface water
rights, the substitution of one source of supply for another, the establishment of public
management agencies, and conjunctive management." Id. at 221.
PERSPECTIVE
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taken for storage. Comparatively, therefore, the employment of
empty or downdrawn aquifers for seasonal supply is an advantagement since water stored in them rather than in surface reservoirs will be protected from sedimentation, from erosion,
from pollution, from surface run-off, and from acid rain. With
ground storage, water is warehoused; aquifers receive protection;
the surface land is given support against subsidence; and land
4
use is not limited to holding water.'
Industry also has intermittent demands for water, especially
water used in smelting, steam-powering, and other cooling processes. Once used, this water can be injected into an aquifer for
later use, altering temperatures within the aquifer in terms of
later industrial employments. Since aquifers do not have the
duty of surface waters in maintaining aquatic biota, this alteration in temperatures is unlikely to impose any environmental
hazard. "
Because aquifer recharge often has to originate on surfaces
substantially distant from the aquifer, if natural recharge mechanisms are to be used in an artificial recharge process, careful
thought must be given to the location of spreading zones. ,6 These
are the areas over which water is lagooned or injection wells are
spaced in order to speed up or induce aquifer recharge. Substantial investments must be made for the erection of channels,

D. Agthe, PotentialBenefits and Costs of Inground Storage of Imported Water,
129 (1986).
Underground storage is frequently feasible because a . . . region has historically been overdrafting the [aquifer] that underlies it, leaving space in
the aquifer for imported water to be stored. This storage space can occur
at the consumption site or at an intermediate point between water supply
and the market. Id.
,1Subsidence, supra note 7, at 129 (citing practices in China where aquifers drawn
down in the summer are injected with cooler water in the winter, causing less water to
be used for cooling the following summer since the water redrawn from aquifer is
colder). This study group points out, on the basis of extensive Japanese experience with
reinjection of degassed water (i.e., water from which methane gas has been withdrawn
for industrial fuel usage), back-washing at adequate intervals is necessary to continue
long-term injection. Id. at 130 (more is involved technically than simply putting water
into an emptied aquifer).
16G. Brighenti, Water Resource Management in Areas Subject to Land Subsidence,
in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS
OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc., I 65, 71 (I. Kosinsky and de Somer, eds.,
1985).
1

22

WATER RESOURCES BULL.
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levees, and control structures for the water during the time
required for it to percolate to the aquifer. 7 A permanent pooling
of water on that ground surface would not be required. The
surface, however, would be unusable for periods of time. This
inability to use the surface in the spreading zones poses the
greatest problem in situations where the recharged aquifer does
not lie immediately below the pool from which it is recharged. 8
This separation would require the consent of the land owner of
the spreading zone, a consent presumably purchased by the
owner of the aquifer being recharged.
Where the surface is above the recharged aquifer and where
the owner of the surface uses the water withdrawn from the
aquifer for use on that surface, the combination of interests
resolves potential legal conflicts. Where the location of the recharging pool has to be on a surface not above the aquifer and
when the water redrawn from the aquifer would not be used on
the surface where the recharge facilities are located, legal ingenuity would have to solve the problem. But, then, in the whole
process of water harvesting, water transfer, conjunctive management of water regardless of source, legal ingenuity for common
management is a necessity.' 9
As French water managers have determined,
Cette relation implique necessairment une composante fonctionelle d'usage, ainsi que des liaisons 'metafonctionneles' des
qu' intervient une multiplicite' des acteurs-c'est-A-dire la prise
en compte d'interactions entre relations fonctionnelles propres
A chacun de ceux ci dans le cadre d'un 'systeme regule'....
Si les relations de type amont-aval s'y pr&ent en g6n6ral assez
17 Agthe, supra note 14, at 129-30. "[T]he high cost of acquisition of land rights
in the spreading zone or rights to the aquifer [may be discouraging]. If the porous zones
and the aquifer are subject to silting, this could also reduce the value of the groundwater
project." Id. at 130.
11Brighenti, supra note 16, at 72.
[I]nvestigation is concerned with identifying regional aquifers and evaluating their capabilities, recording all water takings and present consumption, establishing their estimated trend up to 2001, assessing the number
of infrastructures currently in operation and planned as well as their
potentialties, searching for new primary and secondary sources of supply
and possibly finding new ways of reclaiming waste waters.
Id.
19 V. Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 EcoLoGy L. Q. 625 (1976).

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

aisement, les relations d'identit6 peuvent &re, beins moins
6vidents lorsque doivent etre consid6r6es les interactions entre
eau souterraines et superficielles, les effects du drainage, l'6rosion diffuse ou les cons6quences de l'impermbabilisation des
sols r6sultant d'am6nagements li6s A une urbanisation. 20
Consequently conjunctive storage, conjunctive use, and con-

junctive management have become an increasingly unavoidable
recourse, if demands for water are to be met with both engi-

neering and economic efficiency. Land which is impermeable
and upon which rainfall merely provides a source for flash floods
illustrates the value of integrated water management. 2' In a basin

whose surface flow and aquifer chargeability are understood as
common elements within a single hydrogeographic region, flood

waters can become a source of value rather than only a cause
of damage, 22 because
[W]e have learned that ground water is usually hydrologically
related to surface water, so that the traditional system of
managing surface water and ground water separately fails to

10Delavalle, Gendrin, Davigo, & Ollagnon, La Gestion Patrimoniale des Eaux
(The PatrimonialManagement of Water), in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND
THEri COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc.
241-43. Translated: This relation necessarily involves a practical component in use, as
well as metafunctionalist ties as soon as a multiplicity of players intervene - meaning
that the responsibility taken for the interactions between practical relations appropriate
to each one of these in the framework of a frictionless system ....
If the upstreamdownstream type of relations yield easily enough, the identified relations can be much
less obvious whenever one must consider the interactions between underground and
surface waters, the effects of the drainage, the diffused erosion or the consequences of
the impermeabilisation of the soils resulting from the land-parceling tied to urbanization.
The authors continue, "Un 'systeme-eau' pourra donc, par la prise en compte de
l'ensemble des relations d'identitds r~put~es capables d'integrer les liaisons fonctionelles
et m~tafonctionelles, constitutes le 'patrimoin commun' de I'ensemble des acteurs concern~s." Id. at 242. (By taking responsibility for the entirety of the relations identified
and with well-known capabilities, water systems will be able to integrate the functional
and metafunctional ties, making up the common heritage of all the actors concerned.).
11 R. Moses, Maximizing Use of Surface and Underground Water Resources in
Rural Areas - Legal Case Histories, WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc. I 1, 8-9
(The article is most concerned with what constitutes a "plan of augmentation" for
expanding appropriative water rights.).
22 E. Popolizio, Criterios para el Analisis y Manejo de las Inundaciones en el
Nordeste Argentino, (Criterion for the Analysis and Management of the Floods of
Northwest Argentina), WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS, I, 389, 394-97.
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reflect the hydrologic reality: conjunctive management of underground and surface resources is required when the two
connect up.23

"Connecting up," though, is more than just an actual or
potential physical interchange with a hydrogeographic region.
As the Argentine water engineer, Eliseo Popolizio, has noted, it
also involves integrative planning for the rapidity of economic
exchange within the region, the technology available, the human
resources at hand, and the infrastructure required to realize all
the potential for a "connecting up." Once humanity develops
the potential aspects of surface and groundwater connections, it
is not enough to note the existing physical interconnections.
Political, social and economic "interconnections" are of equal
importance to the physical ones. 24 The need for simultaneous
25
use of all of them has been known since at least the late 1920s,
but the institutional accommodation has been lacking.

III.

PROTECTING AND REHABILITATING GROUNDWATER AND

AQUIFERS

The difficulty in protecting groundwater from contamination-whether from salt-water intrusion, hazardous wastes, infiltration from agricultural applications of fertilizers and biocides,
or domestic sewage-proves the significance of interconnections.
Pollution of groundwater did not come forward in the public
consciousness until the mid-1970s, either in the United States or
elsewhere in the world. 6 But when that consciousness emerged,
at least a theoretical consensus was produced:

21

C. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 317, 322

(1985) (citing Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27B ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853 (1982)).
24 Popolizio, supra note 22, at 397-401.
11 S. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL.
L. REV. 358, 359-63 (1929) (relying on the recommendations of geologists, economists,
and water engineers). But see Wiel, The Recent Attorneys' Conference on Water Legislation, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 197, 201-03 (1929) (modesty of the proposal attorneys found
acceptable).
16

Wilkinson, supra note 23.
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Water quality management . .. is a complex discipline comprising elements of law, sciences, engineering, administration,
27
economics, and finance.

Since even in the United States many rural water utilities
deliver untreated groundwater and since even treatment does not
remove many of the contaminants coming into groundwater in
these rural areas, prevention of groundwater and aquifer pollu-

tion is an important objective. 28 More and more jurisdictions in
the world are following the ancient example of the Islamic harim,
the protective zone for water-wells, by creating zones of capture
and zones of protection that are usually the same, geographi-

cally. This is new legal action since neither Roman law nor the
English common law made such provisions for protecting
groundwater.
Certain activities within these wellhead zones are prohibited
by new laws. Interdictions can even reach outside the zones, if
water would flow from those prohibited activities into the protected zones. 29 These interdictions extend beyond a few strips of
land beside canals and wells. Such narrow protection was all
that was provided by the Islamic harim from its inception in the

21 E. Fano, M. Brewster & T. Thompson, Water Quality Management in Developing Countries (Pt. 2), in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR COMMUNtTIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc., II, 655, 657. This
article stresses the need, therefore, for "qualified specialists with advanced training."
Id. II, 657. See Sendlein, Ground Water Regulatory Issues: Use of Technical Information
and Geo-science Professions in Preparingfor a Case, in 12TH ANNUAL MINERAL LAW
SEMINAR, MINERAL LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, P-1, P-1-18 (Oct. 2-3,
1987).
. Gessaman, OperationalPerformance of the FmHA Rural Water System Pro-

gram, WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL

AREAS AND THEIR COMmuNITIES,

CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES AssoC.

VTH WORLD

II, 671, 675. In Missouri, half the

systems deliver untreated water from wells. In Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Nebraska, the groundwater supplied to customers by the systems was treated but was
regarded as poor quality. These figures are descriptive as of the mid-1980s. Id.
9 W. Loy, Evolution Recente de la Legislation sur les Eaux Souterraines en
Belgique, in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD
CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc. II, 805, 806 (Recent Evolution of
Legislation Concerning the Underground Waters in Belgium). A decret of 24 January
1984 reinforced those zones: "Ainsi l'eau sera mieux prot~g6e contre les risques de
pollution et les menaces d'6puissment et ce particuli&ement pendant son s6jour souterrain
DO elle est vuln6rable de manire irreversible." Id. at II, 809. (Thus, the water will be
better protected against the risks of pollution and the threats of exhaustion and particularly during its underground stay where it is vulnerable in an irreversible way.).
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7th century A.D. until the breakdown of Islamic legal practices
concerning this harim in the 19th century A.D.30 Modern urbanindustrial states, with their massive drafts of groundwater, discharges of wastes, and chemically dependent agricultural practices, need far larger protective zones. The protective zones for
groundwater, indeed, may have to encompass subregions.
Public consciousness is focused mostly on pollution of aquifers that are sources for the public's drinking water. In the
United States prior to 1974, federal legislative interest extended
only to the bacterial contamination of water leading to human
infection. Since that year, Congress has included a wide range
of other sources of risk in drinking water to human health.3 1
As part of groundwater's protection, Congress instituted requirements for underground injection control and, later, extended its legislative mandates to groundwater contamination
from landfills and surface impoundments.3 2 Finally, Congress in
1986 adopted a statute extending further protection to underground public drinking water sources.33 A reluctant President
Reagan signed it, expressing regret that the major role assigned
34
to the federal government was at the expense of state authority.

30

TECLAFF,

supra note 13, at 222-223.

600, 600-03 (F. Anderson, D.
Mandelker, D. Tarlock, eds., 1984).
32 See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, [hereinafter Safe Water Act], 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(f), (j)-(q) (1982); Underground Injection Control Program [hereinafter UIC], 42
U.S.C. § 300(h) (1982). Some other statutes enacted later that are implicated in protection
of drinking water sources, as well as potentially all aquifers from contamination, are
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRA], 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016907, 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-6949, 6951-6954, 6961-6964, 6971-6979, 6981-6986
(1982); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 [hereinafter CERCLA] 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982); the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act [hereinafter SARA], codified as amended at scattered sections
of 10, 26, 19, 33 & 42 U.S.C. (which also added an independent statute); The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, [hereinafter Right to Know Act], 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 Pamphlet)).
,1 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, [hereinafter Amendments], 15
U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1261 note, 1263; 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 note, 300(f), 300(g-1) to 300(g-6),
300(g) notes, 300(h), 300(h-l), 300(h)2, 300(h)4 to 300(h)7, 300(i), 300(i)1, 300(j), 300(1),
3000)1 note, 300(j)2 to 3000)4, 3000)7, 3000)11, 6039(b), 6979(a), 6979(b) (1988).
11See 22 WEEKLY CoMts'. PREs. Doc. 831 (June 19, 1986); N.Y. Times, June 21,
1986, § I (Sunday) at 8, col. 2 (President Reagan's remarks). See also, K. Gray, DrinkingWater Act Amendments Will Tap New Sources of Strength, 8 NAT'L L. J. 51, 16-17
(Sept. 1, 1986).
31

ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

Once the danger of drinking water contamination had manifested
itself, no one in national politics wanted to appear indifferent
to the risks.
Certainly conditions indicated both contaminated drinking
water sources and a need for the wide scope of federal action
in the United States. In the mid-1980s, out of 954 cities with
populations exceeding 10,000 whose underground drinking water
supplies were tested, 275 had been contaminated by water leaching from landfills and surface water impoundments.35 Underground storage tanks, as well as these other sources, have caused
major harm, much of it of a permanent and irreversible character, to groundwater that currently is-or can be anticipated to
become-a source for public drinking water supplies.3 6 Judy
Campbell Byrd has said that aquifers are vulnerable to so many
different kinds of pollution sources because,
Land-use patterns tend to group more than one potential source
of contamination together. For example, industrial parks are
sometimes constructed on former municipal landfills and may

5 R. REPETTO, WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESOURCE
13 (1986). The Ohio EPA environmental toxicologist, Gerald Poje, says
that the discovery of additional contaminants in community water supplies "is directly
related to the level of effort to test for pollutants." 15 THiE HOTLINE (Ohio Environmental
Council Newsletter), no. 9, 6 (1986). Current testing in such states as Ohio presently "is
sporadic and highly localized at best." Id. Correction, once contamination has been
discovered, includes removing the wells from service, air-stripping treatment systems,
and isolating contamination sources. Id. The USEPA in Region V (Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan) has begun testing 15,000 community supply wells (of
which one half had been tested by mid-1986) for VOC (volatile organic compounds)
contamination. VOCs are used as degreasers, solvents and dry-cleaning fluids. Regulatory
limits exist at the federal level so that many VOCs in allowable concentrations can be
present in drinking water. Id. at 1. Conditions are far worse for public drinking water
supplies in other countries. See Taplin & Meinking, Health and Safety in thte Field:
Provision of Potable Water, UNIV. OF MIAI Pua. 901, 3 (1986) (even treated municipal
supplies in the United States can be sources of water-borne disease). See Juranek,
Giardiasis: Transmissionand Control, 2 GENERAL ECOLOGY'S WATER RESEARCH UPDATE,
No. 1, 4 (1986). Rarely, though, does this disease come from supplies drawn from
underground, Id. at 3.
11 S. Anthony, Groundwater Pollution Control: A National Crime, A Regional
Strategy, 2 PACE ENVTL. L.REr. 215, 231-32 (1985). "Essentially, special and vulnerable
groundwaters would receive a high level of protection, while groundwater that is not a
potential source of drinking water or other beneficial use would not. Variances would
be applied as necessary," Id. at 233 (discussing USEPA's National Groundwater Strategy).
MANAGEMENT,
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tanks, as
contain waste disposal sites and underground storage
7
well as likely spots for accidental leaks or spills.
What seemed like a most practical ideal to a land-use planner
becomes a serious threat to an aquifer, absent major efforts to
prevent invasion of the aquifer by contaminants.
Natural conditions relative to groundwater present good news
and bad news concerning aquifer protection. The soil layers
through which water percolates in the process of reaching the
aquifer have mechanisms that prevent or slow down the movement of potential contaminants from the ground surface or soil
zone into the aquifer. The "mechanisms include chemical precipitation, chemical degradation, volatilization, biological deg38
radation, biological uptake, and adsorportion."
Once the contaminant succeeds in reaching the aquifer, the
further good news is that there is very little dispersion. The
contaminated water moves very slowly through the aquifer so
that contamination is localized.3 9 A well, therefore, could be
drawing uncontaminated water from a portion of the aquifer
only a few feet from where intensely contaminated water is
located. 4° For these reasons, both surface conditions and parts
of an aquifer can be very contaminated, with people still able
to draw good water from the aquifer. That, then, is the good
news.
What of the bad? The power of natural cleansing mechanisms in the soil can be overwhelmed by too much contamination.

3

j. BYRD, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION: EMERGING ISSUES AND POLICY CHALLENGES

7 (1985).
38

GORDON, supra note 10, at 37-38.

Many organic substances have extremely low solubility in water and readily
settle out of solution or, "precipitate".... When substances transform
from the solid phase or from the dissolved phase to the vapor phase, they
diffuse in the atmosphere [which is volatilization]. . . . [Slubstances . ..
that are relatively soluble, nonvolatile, and refractory [not readily susceptible to biological degradation] . . . [are prevented] from readily migrating
from the land surface into aquifer systems [by] adsorption. Minerals and
amorphous (uncrystallized) inorganic and organic substances in the soil
zone, and in deeper geological materials, all provide surface for adsorption
of organic compounds.
Id. at 37-38.
11 BYRD, supra note 37, at 2-3.
10Anthony, supra note 36, at 216-17.
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Furthermore, not all soil overlays have these natural cleansing
mechanisms, nor do all contaminants lend themselves to being
volatilized, caught, degraded, or drawn up in biological activities. As for the contaminated aquifer itself, the slow movements
of liquids within it make contamination "a semi-permanent condition once it has occurred." ' 4' Beyond the risk of permanent
areas of
aquifer loss, localization makes the job of discovering
42
difficult.
extremely
contamination within an aquifer
Three generalizations can be made about groundwater and
contamination. First of all, the restorative cleansing of an aquifer is expensive. Second, restorations are "time consuming."
"Because most problems have been recognized only after the
pollutant has been moving and spreading for a number of years,
the areal extent of pollution is ofter quite large [despite slow
motion within the aquifer]. Consequently, it takes a long time
to clean up these large problems." ' 43 And, third, the best efforts
often fail. Even second and third clean-up attempts do not
always produce a satisfactorily cleansed aquifer. 44
Under these circumstances, and given the greater legal mandates to clean up contamination, decision makers are required
to be conscientious about risk-assessment. Avoidance of a need
to clean up has become important to them. Those who have to
locate landfills, underground storage tanks and conduits, treatment lagoons, and other potential sources of contamination
should know that they cannot make a mistake in location or
operation without incurring serious liability. They need as much
information as they can accumulate before a decision is made,
or they risk causing profound environmental impacts, as well as
being liable for heavy damages later. The problem for these

41

Id. at 217.

,1 See generally GORDON, supra note 10, at 3 (once contaminated, groundwater
can remain so for thousands of years).
41 L.
CANTER & R. KNOX, GROUND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 8 (1986) [hereinafter CANTER & KNOX].
" Id. "Because ground water cleanup activities are, in general, expensive, considerable interest exists in analyzing costs . .. [by way of] risk assessment, cost benefit
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, decision-tree analysis, trade-off matrices, and sensitivity analysis for alternatives evaluation." Id. at 163.
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decision makers, even when they try, lies in the paucity of
pertinent information."
In drafting the National Groundwater Protection Stategy,
the USEPA "found that contamination was a wide-spread problem..., that groundwater was vulnerable to contamination, hard
to monitor, and difficult to clean up; and that groundwater was
almost nonrenewable once it was contaminated."4' The best
course of action, therefore, is to prevent contamination of unpolluted aquifers or further intensification of pollution in aquifers already partially polluted, rather than allowing contamination
and then cleaning it up. Maybe there is a "vast technical ability
of this nation to solve its water problems . . . . 47 But there are
better ways to use that technology than creating polluted aquifers
to be cleaned up.
Not that the cleaning of aquifers should not be undertaken.
The efforts can be as simple as capping the aquifer with a layer
of clay to block percolation of contaminants downward from
the surface.4 Or a barrier to the plume movement of pollution
within the aquifer can be provided by an hydraulic wall. Drains
would drop water from the surface, so that clean water, by
flowing along the sides of the plume would seal off the pollution. 49 Perhaps the simplest recourse of all is the introduction
of bacteria into an aquifer contaminated with elements capable

11Id. at 159-60. "The main problem faced by all risk-assessment techniques is that
a large portion of the needed information, such as risk pathways or acceptable concentrations, is unknown," Id. at 160. T. WATSON, R. HALL, J. DAVIDSON, & D. CASE,
HAzARaous WASTES HANDBOOK 1-1 to 1-5 (4th ed., 1982) (makes this point emphatically).
46 GREGG, supra note 4, at 297.
47 Anthony, supra note 36, at 218.
" BYRD, supra note 37, at 3.
More complex and expensive methods include trying to contain the contamination by building physical barriers, altering the groundwater flow,
neutralizing the contaminants in the aquifer and/or pumping out, treating
the water, then returning it to the aquifer. All are very limited in their
effectiveness ....
[A]ll are expensive ....
All also require experienced,
technically qualified people to tailor the clean-up technology to the needs
of the particular site and to implement the clean-up plan.
Id. at 3-4. See also, R. Klox, L. CANTER, D. KINCANNON, E. STOVER & C. WARD,
AQUIFER RESTORATION: STATE OF THE ART (1986).
49 GORDON , supra note 10 at 40. The dewatering of an aquifer can help cleanse it
as well as pumping the water to the surface for aeration, though it is cheaper if the
aquifer can be trenched so that water can simply flow out of it. Id. at 39.
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of bacterial degradation. This method has perhaps less risk than
the use of chemical additives for the reneutralization of contaminants introduced into the aquifer. 0
Often one thinks of oxygen as a necessity for bacterial action.
Oxygen is often present in aquifers in the dissolved form needed
for bacterial action. But anaerobic conditions facilitate some
bacteria and many compounds can be broken down better by
such action. 5' In addition to oxygen, nutrients must be present
for bacteria. The introduction of these necessary nutrients may
lead to further contamination.
Microbial ecology for cleaning up aquifers, hazardous waste
sites, mine drainage, and other contaminated waters is a recent
research area, but "[mjicrobial metabolism is probably the most
effective process in removing the compounds from the environment. . . ." under many difficult circumstances. 52 In addition to
fecal matter which traditionally has been biodegraded by bacteria, heavy metals, phosphorus, and carbonaceous materials respond to biochemical oxygen demanding bacteria. 3
A larger issue still under extensive scientific inquiry is the
ability of bacteria to handle toxic organic chemicals. As of the
late 1980s little is known concerning the degradation of trace
organics in groundwater. In the United States, several projects
10BYRD, supra note 37, at 3-4. The author's level of belief is low in the efficacy
of any method: "For example, physical barriers deteriorate, flow alterations may be
incomplete, and treatment neutralizes only specific contaminants." Id.at 4. Since genetic
engineering is a likely prerequisite for microbial rehabilitation of contaminated aquifers,
risks exist. See Pierce, Development of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms to Degrade Hazardous Organic Compounds, in HAzARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT FOR THE
1980's, 431, 433-434 (Sweeney, Bhatt, Sykes, and Sprout, eds. (1982)).
1 Anerobic action of this kind is similar, of course, to what occurs in the
indigenous microbiota of the human alimentary system. This digestive process is as
important to human existence as the biooxygen degradation in nature and the dissolved
oxygen process fundamental to much aquatic life. See such basic works as C. KELSEY,
THE PH-YSICAL BASIS OF LIFE, 37-40 (2nd ed., 1928), J. BIRKELAND, MICROBIOLOGY AND
MAN, 66-67 (2nd ed., 1949), R. DuBos, MAN ADAPTING, 110-15 (1965).

11 M. Lee, J. Thomas, & C. Ward, Microbially Mediated Fate of Ground Water
Contaminantsfrom Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites, in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL
AREAS AND Timut CoMMMrrTEs, VTm WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES
Assoc., I, 113, 114 (1985). See also, Id. at 115.
11S. Hutchins & C. Ward, Microbial Involvement in the Removal of Trace
Organics During Rapid Infiltration Recharge of Ground Water, in WATER RESOURCES
FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT'L RESOURCES Assoc. I, 123, 124 (1985).
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have demonstrated that many trace organics in wastewater can
4
be bacterially removed.1
Where aquifers are being recharged by rapid infiltration an
optimistic conclusion can be reached. These methods are either
a quick natural recharge or an artificial program which increases
the water available for percolation without pretreatment. If the
biologists working with bacteria in cleaning aquifers, or treating
water on the surface before it can percolate or be injected into
aquifers, are correct in their conclusions about the utility of the
processes for all but a few "recalcitrant compounds," then the
news is good.5
The best should not be the enemy of the good in pursuing
biological or physicochemical means of cleaning up contaminated water. We will not turn waste into distilled water. But
where public drinking water sources are concerned even one
"recalcitrant" is too many. And the number of "recalcitrants"
is likely to remain large in an urban-industrial economy which
is dependent on chemical technology used in industrial, commercial, and agricultural operations.
Even if clean up techniques for aquifers were cheap, sure
and speedy-which none is-the risks attaching to the existence
of "recalcitrant compounds" (and to their as yet uninvented
future companions) would require programs effectively protecting groundwater as well as such other sinks as lakes and oceans
from contamination. 6 Only by keeping the contaminants out of
groundwater can a reliable source of water for any human
purpose be provided.
The protection of aquifers from contamination, therefore,
has to be a land-based planning operation.5 7 American federal
Pierce, supra note 50, at 435.
Hutchins & Ward, supra note 53, at 124. "Groundwater has recently been
recognized as a limited and vulnerable natural resource. . . .Yet most studies indicate
that little attenuation of organic chemicals should occur in rapid infiltration systems."
They found in 1985 that "there is virtually no information on long-term degradation of
trace organics in ground water." Id.
56 The ocean is the universal sink. It suffers in this capacity to a far greater extent,
but in a manner similar to the absorptive capacities of lakes and aquifers. See TrE 1985
CITIZEN's GUIDE TO THE OCEAN 72 (1985). This book emphasizes the risks of industrial
dumping of wastes at sea, which is a small problem compared to most other water
pollution problems. Id. at 63, 67.
17 Hutchins & Ward, supra note 53, at 124. "Land application is generally effective
...
Id.
for the removal of many wastewater constitutents.
"
"
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law increasingly recognizes this fact. Sites exist in every state
containing landfills and other surface sources of aquifer peril in
the United States. For example, though sites can no longer be
located in places dangerous to groundwater under current law,
the state and federal governments still must deal with old sites
that are existing, and persisting, dangers. Many of these are the
sites that Superfund focuses upon for remedial correction.5 8
These troubled sites must have developed for them "remedial
action master plant" (RAMP) that will "identify the type, scope,
sequence, and schedule of remedial projects which may be appropriate in meeting an identified need . .. [and] [aidditionally
• . .lists the phases of a site contamination and liability audit." 5 9
Although immediate remedial actions are required by the RAMP,
of greater significance is the RAMP's requirement of immediate
action. Site-specific studies capable of developing better longterm solutions must be made. The RAMP drawing from these
studies must contain analyses of alternative remedies to those
selected; and all analyses must consider environmental impacts,
costs, and risks of the procedures chosen by the RAMP, in order
to prevent the cure from being worse than the initial disorder.
After all, the purpose of RAMP is to develop the "optimal
solution for meeting a given need."60
This RAMP action corrects not only past land use mistakes
but also provides for aquifer decontaminations. What land actions might be taken that truly would prevent the reasonable
chance of aquifer contamination? The answers are not easily
determined in a technology that must produce, store, move, use
and dispose of large volumes of substances whose penetration
into any aquifer must cause damages ranging from serious to
irreversible. 61 Maybe the answers on how to decontaminate are

,"CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982).
" CANTER & KNox, supra note 43, at 160.
60 Id. at 160. "Most of the work in developing structural approaches or protocols
for addressing ground water pollution problems has been conducted in response to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, P. L. 96-510
(known as CERCLA or 'superfund')." Id. at 159.
62 The extent of risks at each of these stages is made clear by the excellent coverage
in a two volume set of study materials: THE AMERICAN LAW INsTrruE/AimRiCAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, HAzARDous
WASTES, SUPERFUND, AND

Toxic

SUBSTANCES

(1985).
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more available than the answers on how not to contaminate an
aquifer.
Four basic management strategy options are available for
selection in any sort of national groundwater protection program. These options range from a goal that may be unrealistically high to the lowest goal of losing some aquifers in order to
continue certain surface activities that the economy considers of
more value than any potential future value in the lost aquifers.
The options are:
[1] Uniform management, which supplies the same protection
mechanisms equally to all groundwater. [2] Aquifer classification, which groups groundwater into categories allowing protection to vary from class to class. [3] Contaminant
classification, which groups types of contaminants and allows
priorities to be set for protecting against contamination from
specific substances. [4] Contamination source classification,
which identifies specific sources of contamination and 62establishes methods and priorities for protection from them.
The United States National Groundwater Protection Strategy
rejected the first option on the basis that "the variation among
groundwater formations, uses, and quality was so vastly different from place to place that it was impossible to construct and
' 63
apply a national policy or uniform standards in all states.
Instead, the strategy
identifies three classes of groundwater sources. Class I aquifers
are irreplaceble drinking water sources. Class II aquifers are
current and possible sources, but are replaceable. Class III
sources are aquifers with undrinkable water ....

[As a result,

62 BRYD, supra note 37, at 19. Byrd thinks that option I "may be an unrealistically
high goal," Id. at 21. The second option, critics say, gives a license to pollute as long
as the groundwater quality level is not exceeded. Option 3 "assumes some groundwater
is not valuable. Potentially contaminating activities may be sited over aquifers of poor
quality." Id. at 24.
613Anthony, supra note 36, 225-26. In an earlier USEPA draft this produced "the
fear that EPA will use the 'lowest common denominator' of degradation of aquifers,
and by doing so will intrude into state allocation laws, and be susceptible to politically
expedient decisions." Id. at 222. (She sets out the history of the development of the
strategy ultimately proposed on August 30, 1984, and seems to have reservations about
USEPA's motives.).

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

USEPA has established] a priority identification process for
cleanup and location of hazardous and chemical waste disposal
sites. Existing sites located over Class I aquifers would be
given top priority in cleanup considerations. Potential sites
located over Class I aquifers would not be eligible for new
disposal or siting permits. 64
Obviously these aquifer classifications and clean up priority
schedules relate to the different options concerning the level at
which the protection of groundwater is to be set. This can range
from a very protective program to one not very protective at
all. Of course, compared to the interest previously shown by
law and institutions in groundwater quality protection, even the
standards for the third category would be an improvement.
The national choices concerning groundwater quality in
America are several. One option is to protect groundwater whatever its existing quality might be. This is one of the goals of the
United States National Groundwater Protection Strategy. The
second option is to pick a specific water quality level and then
try to bring selected aquifers up to it, or to allow, conversely,
a downward drift. And, thirdly, a survey of all aquifers could
distinguish them "on the basis of their quality, use, vulnerability
to contamination or other considerations, and then set levels of
protection associated with each type of groundwater. '65 The
United States has chosen to act by classifying aquifers supplying
public drinking water as Class I. The goal selected will be a
significant determinant in this adoption of a surface land management strategy designed to prevent groundwater contamination.
At about the time that the United States adopted its National
Groundwater Protection Strategy, the Federal Republic of Germany developed a national program of zones for wellhead protection. This program interdicted or limited certain surface
activities with the wellhead zones so as to prevent groundwater
contamination. The West Germans, too, had three areal categories called "zones." The German plan focused much more on
controlling surface activity and was far less concerned with

"

5 HYDATA, no. 2, 2 (1986).
at 18-19.

61 BYRD, supra note 37,
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classifying aquifers than is the American. The zones function as
follows:
Zone 1-extends at least 10 meters from the well and excludes
pedestrians, or vehicular traffic, agriculture, and application
of chemicals, plus all activities banned in Zones II and III.
Zone 2-excludes mining, blasting, cemeteries, oil storage,
transport of radioactive substances and all activities not allowed in Zone III. The border of Zone III represents the
distance that groundwater will travel in 50 days.
Zone 3-ideally, would encompass the entire groundwater recharge area, but the true value of Zone III is to provide

sufficient time for corrective action if contamination occurs.
Banned activities include airports, feedlots and storage of potentially polluting substances. 66

Given the broad nature of the prohibitions, however, it is
evident that the German plans are not designed to protect all
groundwater within the country, nor even all major aquifers.
The primary purpose of the German plan, as is the case for the
American, is to protect sources of public drinking water from
contamination-or, speaking in realistic terms, from additional
contamination. Neither country's plan is a total strategy for
protecting all groundwater from all contamination, even if such
67
a strategy were currently a technical and economic possibility.
Evidently, these national programs of highly developed countries can never be cheap to implement. Traditionally people have
not thought about groundwater contamination. They have believed throughout history (excluding, of course, the Islamic at-

4 HYDATA, no. 4, 2 (1985). "To control individual misuse of household chemicals, the Germans also have installed signs at the zone boundaries reminding residents
and those passing by that their drinking water supply lies beneath their feet." Id.
BYRD, supra note 37, lists all of the efforts that would have to be put in place
to accomplish (or even nearly accomplish) that goal: Waste reduction, recycling, and
treatment, Id. at 27-28; effluent limitations and discharge permits, Id. at 29-30; design,
operation and maintenance specifications, Id., 30-31; best management practices to
minimize risk of contamination from non-point sources, Id. at 31-32; controls on
groundwater users to protect well locations, Id. at 32-33; land-use alternatives to prohibit
activities in recharge areas, Id. at 33; technical assistance and training and public
education, Id. at 34-36; incentive programs (tax advantages, loans and cost-sharing),
subsidies, and other economic incentives (limiting crop insurance to farmers following
certain directives, linking subsidies to such directives, etc.). Id. at 34.
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titude) that groundwater was too plentiful or too replenishable
68
to worry about either its contamination or its exhaustibility.
As Robert Repetto of the World Resources Institute has noted,
Throughout most of the world, groundwater is treated as an
open-access, common-property resource, the water belongs to
whomever "captures" it by pumping it to the surface. Unfortunately, anybody can degrade its quality with impunity by
contaminating it with effluents. Subsurface water is becoming
one of the world's most valuable common-property resources,
69
but the losses from improper management are enormous.

The law and institutions become interested in groundwater
only when facts indicate that drinking water sources might be
lost, regional economies might be compelled to reduce regional
gross product, aquifers might be mined to exhaustion just like
oil or coal, and people might be forced into dramatic relocations. 70 It has turned out that there is more to groundwater than
how much can be extracted from the well.
IV.

RESTRICTING HUMAN IMPACT ON GROUNDWATER AND
AQUIFERS

Even dedicated water engineers sometimes overemphasize the
supply function of water withdrawn from the ground. They say,
In formulation of ground water or ground water/surface-water
management model, a suitable objective function is first defined ....

For a ground-water aquifer, the objective function

may be based on minimization of a total cost function ...
maximization of total pumpage . .. maximization of the sum

of values of hydraulic head at specified points, minimization
of the total water shortages . . . or on other objectives such

Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 322: "[W]e have become determined to abate water
pollution, an issue given little or no attention in prior appropriation law." The same
indifference substantially marked jurisdictions having the three Anglo-American rules of
law for groundwater other than the appropriation doctrine.
REPETTO, supra note 35, at 62.
,o Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 327. He focuses on the present and potential
69

problems of the Ogallala region in the United States, but his fears would fit other places,
where the problems would have more deadly results.

1988]

GROUNDWATER AND AQUIFERS

as the minimization of the sum of the squared differences
between demanded and supplied pumpages.71
There is generally more to the use of groundwater these days
than is contained within this management mode.
A UNESCO publication claims that other demands or potential responses must be included in any groundwater management plan. 72 Provision must be made for substitute water in the
event of inadvertent over-pumpage. Plans for the conservation
in the application and use of water must be prepared. The legal
system must be provided a means of equitably apportioning
overdrawn groundwater or its surface-water substitution. If recirculation and reuse of water is possible, plans must be in place
to provide for them, or else plans must be in place for decreasing
irrigation or reducing industrial production that has a heavy
groundwater withdrawal component.
UNESCO insists that some provision must be made to change
the "depth range of perforated intervals in well casing or screens
to tap less compressible deposits, ' 73 unless moving the wells in
the field to tap "less compressible layers, ' 74 has been included
in the management plan from the beginning. At the same time,
UNESCO's proposal indicates that these provisions do not exhaust environmental and socioeconomic concerns. Planning must
be made for major groundwater withdrawals that might interrupt
or interdict natural recharge and for withdrawals that are not
7
accompanied with artificial recharge mechanisms .

M. Heidari, Optional Management of Large Aquifers for Irrigation Activity, in
RURAL AREAS AND Tanni COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS
OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc. I, 1003, 1004 (1985). The "objective function,"
however, is qualified:
Various physical, legal, and environmental constraints that must be satisfied
The constraints associare subsequently included in the formulation ....
ated with these objective functions may include the maximum allowable
drawdown and pumpage, and other quantifiable environmental, physical,
and legal constraints.
Id. at 1004. (Still, these qualifications are scarcely uppermost in the planner's model.).
1 GUIDEBOOK TO STUDIES OF LAND SUBSIDENCE, supra note 6.
11Considerations, supra note 6, at 127.
71

WATER RESOURCES FOR

74 Id.

7, Subsidence, supra note 7, at 127. They are concerned with preventing land
subsidence from groundwater withdrawal, but what they believe must be included in any
groundwater management plan to prevent subsidence must also be included for other
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Traditionally, those who use water and those who plan its
use have been in conflict. This conflict occurs even when careful
planning and legislation have been designed to phase in equitable
solutions to water crises. The findings of Leslie Mack, an American water specialist, have been summarized as:
[U]nderlin[ing] overuse of water; quality degradation, failure
to utilize available water and to have laws and regulations
compatible with natural laws; lack of authority to make decisions; and lack of desire of conflicting users to find solutions.
As to prevention and resolution, she suggests inter alia providing state and local laws and regulations compatible with the
natural occurrence and flow of water; organizing water districts
with a manageable size; determining rules of use between users
before conflicts arise, according to dynamic water regimes and
not according to static permits; encouraging conservation and
conjunctive use of surface and groundwater when possible;
maintaining user participation in decision-making; and keeping
76
administrative decisions on a local level when possible.
In brief, all the good things are in this list that good people
ought to want for both public and private good, whatever the
cynical may believe. Nevertheless, here are at least some of the
problems that must be addressed. These are also the goals that
must be attained in managing both the use of groundwater and
surface water which will serve for all but the simplest subsistence
economies.
Whenever groundwater is dealt with on a regional basis, two
worlds intermingle: the physicobiological (the renewable, stock,
and living resources) and the socioeconomic (social and economic
structures). Too often the latter has been thought to flourish at
the expense of the former by transferring costs as if such externalities could be indefinitely passed away.

reasons as well. Included, for example, are "conservation" proposals for changing "from
ditch and furrow or to floor irrigation to overhead sprinkler irrigation or to drip
irrigation" and "through change from crops requiring heavy [water] duty or demand to
crop requiring less [water] duty, such as from cotton to orchards," Id. (One can imagine
the political consequences of such proposals, even if only preproposed, much less if
brought forward onces a crisis had appeared.).
6 Results, supra note 1, at 67, 68-69. See Legislation, supra note 2, at 462-63
(abstract of the paper by Leslie Mack).
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[M]odern man justifies his continuous assaults on nature on
the assumption of limitless environmental frontiers. This assault . . . translates itself into a continuous 'process of externality transfer', towards both environment and society, leading
to a disregard of the community's rights, both public and
77
private.
But that cannot be all there is to reality. Regional socioeconomic
systems that are dependent on groundwater, or its conjunctive
use with surface water, are complexly hierarchical, with many
interdependent elements. 7 They are not free of the physicobiological.
The users of the environment directly interact with the physicobiological in as exploitative a fashion as their technologies
allow. These users, those who are the lowest in the region's
socioeconomic hierarchy, tend to focus on highly local goals
without regard for much coordination with others around them,
or above them, in the hierarchy. National governments, at least
in theory, have broader goals that cover the whole region, as do
elements high in the economic hierarchy, for example, multinational corporations, whose levels of exploitation encourage them
to be less parochial and, perhaps, more willing to internalize
some costs in order to stretch out the possibilities of exploita79
tion.
Nowhere, however, are many altruists or selfless advocates
of the physicobiological systems present. In a socioeconomic
hierarchy with a comprehensive outlook, participants need not
be altruists. Costs simply cannot continuously be passed on to
the renewing environment. Constraints must be accepted on the

"

Subsidence, supra note 1, at 71-72 (summarizing Miguel Solanes, LAW, ENVI-

RONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND WATER, LEGISLATION). Solanes "defines the economic

concept of 'externality' as those costs of productive activities which are not taken into
account by policymakers and producers, who transfer their costs to other persons or
society as a whole .
Id. at 71. (A multiplicity of authors could be cited to this
effect.).
11S. Orlovski & P. van Walsum, Water Policies: Regions with Intense Agriculture,
WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS

OF THE INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc., II, 1075, 1076 (1985).
11 Id. "[I]n the majority of real systems these interactions lead to the deterioration
of the environmental subsystem which is potentially dangerous for the existence of the
whole socio-economic system in the long run ....
No formal description can encompass
[however] all the aspects of a real socio-economic subsystem." Id. at 1076-77.
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use of both surface and groundwater. Otherwise, socioeconomic
decision makers will continue to view these sources as amply
able to meet the demands of even a pleonexic human system.8 0
In the case of the groundwater, the dawning of aquifer
consciousness has been slow and comparatively recent. Maybe
the contrary was true for the intelligent ideal of the Islamic
harim protection of wells, but the idea found no imitators in
Western legal systems until quite recently. Too often, the world's
legal systems have been prepared to leave groundwater to a

8
negative sum game. 1
But since 1931 when New Mexico first successfully allowed
an appropriative right in groundwater, 2 there has been an expansion of groundwater law at both the state and federal level
in the United States. Elsewhere also in the world, legal-institutional changes have been instituted to protect, regulate, and
otherwise act positively on behalf of groundwater. Groundwater's users and abusers have come under steadily increasing
regulation 83
Where water is plentiful, an indifference to it is prevalent.
Where water is scarce, a consciousness exists to get more of it,
even when lip-service is being given at the same time to conservation. Neither situation engenders a caring attitude about water.
Too little thought, however, is given water of any sort,
particularly in modern urban-industrial societies whose members
exist in a seeming isolation from nature. If "their sense of living
in a water shed is minimal, 8 s4 how much more minimal must
be their knowledge of living in a region defined by an aquifer?
Most Americans are only generally concerned about water pol-

E. ZIMMIRMANN, WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES 73 (rev. ed., 1951).
REPETTO, supra note 35, at 9 ("The common-property status of many natural
resources creates a destructive negative sum game.").
82 Ch.
131, N.M.L. (1931), now N. M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1-10 (1978) (1987
Supp.).
11Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 317, 336. See Buresh, State and FederalLand Use
Regulation: An Application to Groundwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution Control,
95 YALE L.J. 1433 (1985-86). A proposal has been made for a federal "groundwater
residue guidance level" (GRGL) for pesticides in groundwater, Staff provided by
McKENNA, CONNER & CUNFO, PESTICIDE REGULATION HANDBOOK 10 (rev. ed. 1987).
" 42 POTOMAc BASIN REP. 5, 1, 2 (1986) (based on a survey taken by the Interstate
Commission on the Potomac River Basin, Potomac State College, and Frostburg State
College, with the assistance of the University of Maryland Survey Research Center).
SI
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lution, or water availability, or water use.8 5 This is so even
though water has "unique physical properites" and "plays a
dynamic role in shaping the landscape and creating special habitats for all organisms."

' 86

Only in recent years have urban dwellers acquired a vicarious
consciousness of water problems that are distant in space and
time.8 7 Such changing public perceptions focus on fairly specific
water issues. One might expect, therefore, legal actions to be
fragmentary and not done as part of comprehensive water management.88 Certainly, this has been the description of legalinstitutional developments concerning the regulation of groundwater and the protection of aquifers.
Few lawyers have written as much on water as Dean T.
Massey, whose work summarizes the piece-meal character of
what American states have done in relation to groundwater
regulation and aquifer protection.8 9 Any jurisdiction's doctrine

85

"[T]here is a need for improving the public's general understanding of the

watershed in which they live ..
86

" Id. at 1.

D. GATES, ENERGY AND ECOLOGY 13 (1985). See id. at 14-24 (for a comprehensive

introduction to the "biogeochemical cycles," including the hydrological, carbon, nitrogen, sulfur, and phosphorus cycles).
" Shelley, Schoolmaster, and Roberts, Voter Reactions to the 1976 Water Development and Quality Referenda in Texas, 22 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN, 485, 492
(1986), which analyzes the opposition in humid east Texas, the support in arid west
Texas, especially the Ogallala region (which wanted more state funding for water development) and the support (which carried the election) in the urbanized areas of Dallas,
Fort Worth, Austin and San Antonio, whose benefit would be "financial and aesthetic,"
Id. But see id. at 490, for a discussion of the immediate interest of San Antonio in the
Edwards aquifer, which "has been subjected to intensive use and is highly susceptible
to contamination." (citation omitted).
11 As one example among many potential ones,
Governments in the United States have responded to drought by crisis
management rather than risk management. This approach has been grossly
ineffective ....
The development of a national drought plan is proposed .... [Does] the current approach, or policy, encourag[e] the adoption of appropriate and efficient management practices to ensure against
abnormal risk[?] It would appear that it does not. In fact, current policy
often discourages wise risk management decisions by producers... :
[D]rought policy in the United States [has not been) equitable, consistent,
and predictable ... [and] assistance measures are often implemented in
. . . an ineffective and untimely manner. ...

Wilhite, DroughtPolicy in the U. S. and Australia: A ComparativeAnalysis, 22 WATER
RESOURCES BULLETIN at 425, 436.
"9See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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for the ownership of groundwater while in place in an aquifer
is indicative of what the state may do to those using or abusing
the groundwater. States have been able to act legislatively and
administratively concerning groundwater regardless of doctrine,
even if a fragmentary character has been typical until recently.
Aquifer-consciousness is heightened by no particular judicial
rule about groundwater. Aquifer-consciousness is also not intensified by predisposing legislative inclinations towards either command regulation or fixed property rights. Of course, a choice of
rules that proves effective for protecting groundwater quantity
and quality always produces another result. Aquifer-consciousnes both induces legislative actions and is intensified by
successful legislative action. However, profound failure, too, can
be the advocate for aquifer-consciousness.
The legal restrictions that have been imposed on groundwater
over the years since 1931 have been mostly physical in nature.
The rules often have been borrowed from what the law of oil
and gas has provided for in situ conservation measures. This
legal borrowing is not surprising because, both geologically and
technically, a close relationship has existed from the mid-19th
century between those drilling for and producing oil and gas for
those drilling for and withdrawing water. 9°
Therefore, just as with oil and gas wells, one of the most
common regulations in groundwater law has been well spacing.
In the case of groundwater, the intention is to prevent unduly
deepening and narrowing the cones of water withdrawal in aquifers, dropping water tables from over-pumping, and interfering
among pumpers in their water withdrawals. These regulations
establish a minimum distance between the location of wells. In
addition, irrigation and industrial wells have been prohibited
from locating within specified distances of public drinking water
wells.gl

'o S. TAIT, THE WILDCATTERS: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF OIL-HUNTING IN AMERICA,
46-54 (1946) (In the early history of oil extraction in Pennsylvania and West Virginia,
the salt-well drillers were the source of much technology for the burgeoning oil and gas
industry and also the probable source of the new industry's now long-established indifference to brine pollution.).
91 Massey & Sloggett, Groundwater Management in Ogallala Aquifer for Irrigation;
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIALTY CONFERENCE, AM. SOCIETY OF CIVwL ENGINEERS 44,
48-49 (July 24-26, 1984) [hereinafter Massey & Sloggett].
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The regulations on well spacing have been coupled with
quantity restrictions on the amount of groundwater to be withdrawn from each well in order to maintain the productive resource of the aquifer as long as possible, particularly if the
aquifer is being mined rather than exploited under conditions of
recharge. Often regulation is done on a basin or sub-basin wide
basis, rather than well by well, thus encouraging aquifer consciousness. The restrictions may be permanent. They also may
be temporarily imposed while a hydrological survey of the aquifer is being conducted to determine the maximum withdrawal
with some degree of
rate that can be maintained, consonant
92
forces.
natural
through
recharge
Since pumping from one well can lower the production of
another well tapping the same aquifer, states seek to protect "a
reasonable groundwater pumping level .. . either [in terms of]
water level in the ground or pumping lift to the surface." 93 Of
course, prohibitions against waste accompany all of this, requiring the capping of flowing wells and the operation of tailwater
pits to collect runoff for recirculation or reinjection in the aquifer. 94 But, if prohibitions against waste were sufficient, the law
would not have to address itself as to how "reasonable" groundwater pumping levels are to be maintained.
The state can simply set a limit on the quantity to be extracted, estimating that the aquifer can meet the restricted demand for each of the wells allowed. Or the state can mandate
that, if technical improvements in a well whose withdrawal ability has declined will restore its previous pumpage capacity, then
those technical improvements must be made before the state will
intervene. Still other choices exist if the state demands "reasonable" actions in this task of water table maintenance.
All choices focus public attention on the existence and the
need to protect and maintain aquifers from which withdrawals

92 Id. at 49-50. (Entitlement to water is often calculated in terms of acreage owned
or leased overlying the aquifer. Some regulations maintain longevity of the aquifer being
mined; rules about depletion are often adopted in relation to the aquifer's rate of
replenishment.).
11 Massey, Economics of Groundwater-PumpingLevel Statutes, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SPECIALITY CONFERENCE, AM. SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 1, 2 (1984).
" Massey & Sloggett, supra note 91, at 50.
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of water are being made for surface use. The emphasis throughout each potential choice is on protecting the source of water
for purposes of human surface use. Choices concerning groundwater generally have been made in an anthropocentric fashion.
Some choices for groundwater made by legal systems
relate to a specific quantity of water and those rights allow
for a reasonable lowering of the static water level at the ...
points of diversion ....an impairment means "unreasonable"

lowering of the state water level when determining whether a
proposed use impairs a use under an existing water right....
[choices also include] requiring that reasonable stable groundwater levels must be [administratively] determined and maintained, [or that the requirement] does not include maintaining
historic levels, [or that it means] withdrawing groundwater
beyond the capacity of the underground bed to yield such
water within a reasonable or feasible pumping lift. 91
Consequently, the most common feature of limitations based on
water levels and water lift is a physical restraint, a physical
maintenance, directly imposed by the law. In recent years, however, some economic criteria have begun to be taken into con-

sideration but economic considerations by state regulators remain
96
the exception.
To enforce these physical limitations, states have created
permit systems for wells, especially those to be newly drilled, in
order to keep track of well location by registration and to reduce
the rate of groundwater depletion. Exempting wells pumping less
than 100,000 gallons per day is common, while even whole areas
of some states are exempted on the basis of presenting no
groundwater "crisis. '97 The regulations are designed to conserve
water, of course; but they are also meant to keep down pumping
costs for those exploiting the aquifer. 9
95 Massey, supra note 93, at 4-5.

96Id. at 5-6. Some rules have the central state agency deny a permit if there would
be an adverse economic effect on the area. Others administatively find pumping "unreasonable" if it is done with superior economic capability, "such as power generating
companies or cities [that] impose costs beyond the economic reach of small prior
appropriators." Id. at 6. Despite the title of his article, Massey's examples mostly
concern physical limitations directly imposed on the groundwater resources in place,
rather than economic considerations.
Massey & Sloggett, supra note 91, at 48.
" Massey, supra note 93, at 2, 6.
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Regulations often implement statutes which limit the use of
groundwater to land where water use will assist in aquifer recharge. The legislative intent behind this "beneficial and economic use" is to keep water on the land of its pumped
origination." The purpose of these statutes is to regulate "evenhandedly," so that preferred rights, if any exist, are protected,
or, if mutual access under a reasonable use doctrine is the
requirement, the general availability of the resource is protected. 100
The interesting common thread running through these illustrations of rules for protecting groundwater and water pumped

from aquifers is the degree to which they focus on location: the
well-field, the recharge area, the basin for surface water interchange, in short, the region-as-aquifer. No longer is the focus
on some abstraction like "freely percolating water." The legalinstitutional emphasis is increasingly on the aquifer, in a manner
that can only raise public consciousness of the importance of
aquifers.
First, the aquifers supplying public drinking water became
the objects of attention. Then, the aquifers supplying water for
any human purpose came into regulatory focus. Later still, the
aquifers that might be of future use for some human purpose
became natural resources requiring protection.
Perhaps, eventually, all aquifers and groundwater will receive
the advantages of protective regimes. But, in the meantime, the
public consciousness concerning aquifers steadily is being raised.
The current plenitude of judicial decisions, statutes, administrative regulations, scholarly commentary, and popular writing on
the subject begins to bring into political play that public aquiferconsciousness which has been so sadly lacking in the past.

Massey, Interbasin Transfers of Water in Ogallala States, in PROCEEDINGS OF
AM. SOCIETY OF CtviL ENGINEERS, at 223-31 (July, 1985).
11 Massey, Great Lakes Water Diversion: Legal Issues, in PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIALITY CONFERENCE, AM. SOCIETY OF Civ. ENGINEERS, at 864, 870 (June 10-12, 1985).
(While Massey concentrates on the appropriation jurisdictions, he is also concerned with
jurisdictions that operate under the other three rules.). See also Massey, Laws Affecting
Inter-Basin Water Transfers in the United States, PROCEEDINGS, IWRA [INTERNATIONAL
WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION] SEMINAR ON INTER-BASIN WATER TRANSFER, at 15-19
(June 1986) (See Id. at Beijing: Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Society, 1986, 57-66 for
a more comprehensive treatment.).
THE SPECIALITY CONFERENCE,
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PROBLEMS IN PAYING FOR THE COSTS OF GROUNDWATER
PROTECTION AND AQUIFER PROTECTION/REHABILITATION

Although legislative actions by American states concerning
groundwater have economic components,10' their major emphases still are upon the direct physical control over reaching the
aquifer, pumping for the aquifer, protecting the aquifer, and
recharging the aquifer. The concentration is on
the development of new or alternate means of points of diversion, but a pooling of water resources, by water exchange
projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the
development of new sources of water .

.

. by the eradication

of phreatophytes [economically useless plants consuming water] . . . [and by] the use of . . . water collected from land
sources which have been impermeable, thereby increasing the
runoff

....

102

Many groundwater problems are unique to their physical and
geological settings. Local soil conditions operate to facilitate,
inhibit, or affect the quality of water percolating through these
settings. Waters in aquifers produce more complex implications
of a legal character than surface water because of these soil
conditions.

,o, In California, for example, a pump tax or replenishment assessment can be
levied on all groundwater extracted. Basin equity assessments, in addition, can be
imposed, increasing or decreasing the cost of groundwater. This regulates pumping
patterns and influences the amount pumped. Joseph F. Poland attributes the success of
California's program substantially to these assessment powers, Poland, Carbognin, Yamamoto and the Working Group. See Considerations,supra note 6, at 124. In Arizona,
persons withdrawing groundwater within the AMA's first must pay an ultimate withdrawal fee of not over $5.00 per acre foot (in 1984 it was 50 cents per acre foot) to
cover half the cost of administration, the cost of augmentation projects, and (in later
years) the purchase for retirement of grandfathered rights. See Ferris, Water Demand
- Sharing a Limited Source, 4 HYDATA, no. 5, 8 (1985). It is too early to tell if this
charge will have the positive economic impact attributed to the California pumpage
charges.
source of
102 Moses, supra note 21, at 1, 1, 8-9. (Moses is speaking of a "new"
supply to be obtained for an "overburdened system" without injury to any water user.
Phreatophytes are plants drawing their water from the water table or soil layer just
above it.).
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Consequently, the emphasis upon the physical in the case of
groundwater is understandable. 3 However understandable, the
emphasis has over-stressed the physical. The neglect of what
might be called the metaphysical aspect of groundwater has been
the result. Human culture, not natural conditions, is where the
stress should be placed in groundwater use.
Whenever the legal system has to consider elements in nature
that have become resouces for human use, all the physicochemico-geo-environmental and socioeconomic aspects always
have had to be given positive consideration. 104 And the consideration of groundwater is no exception. Today, though, the
decision-makers consciously have a larger series of options easily
available to them.
Traditionally, landowners have thought that if a well were
needed it could be created without asking anyone's permission.
In their view, the cost of making the well, providing the pumpage
mechanism, and paying for the operation of the pump were
investment costs that prevented their actions from being subsidized water uses. But the groundwater itself was regarded by
landowners with wells as a free good from nature. No cash
payment, in their view, ever ought to be extracted from them
05
by any government functionary or users' association.
With such attitudes, a prevalent demand for groundwater
could only be calculated in terms of present use, projected
population, and economic growth. How much water people would
want under these self-accelerating rules has to become the dominant-usually, the sole-consideration. The resource has not
been regarded-indeed, under these conditions, scarcely could
have been regarded-as being capable of having a price. ° 6

"I GREGG, supra note 4, at 279-81. (The significance of the composition of the
physical material upon which rainwater falls, over which it flows, and through which it
percolates is well described in D. Firestone and F. Reed, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR NONLAWYERS, 91-93 (1983).).

1o Orlovski & van Walsum, supra note 78, at I, 1076.
101REPETTO, supra note 35, at 62 and 85.
, Rogers, Fresh Water, in THE GLOBAL PossIBLE: RESOURCES,

DEVELOPMENT, AND

THE NEW CENTURY, 225 (Repetto, ed. 1985).

Demand . . . is a function of specific water uses and of users' characteristics. For a particular use in a particular climatic region, the demand for
fresh water should be a function of both the user's income (or asset
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The direct abstraction of water for use by the abstractor on
his own property at the site of abstraction rarely results in a
charge to the groundwater abstractor anywhere in the world
today. 0 7 The imposition of such charges may be increasing. But,
of far greater certainty, is the knowledge that even the metering
08
of water thus abstracted has been rare.
[T]he right to abstract . . . underground waters which fall in
the private domain of relevant landowners is inherent in the
ownership of land lying above groundwater resources....
[S]uch rights can be exercised free from governmental interference, but subject to legal restrictions in the interest of...
landholders sharing a common ground-water source.' °9
However, what about paying a charge for taking groundwater under these conditions? Such payments are not a common
practice in the world. At least, as yet, payments by landowners
for groundwater extracted from beneath their land remain uncommon.
True, "[it is practically universal practice that water supplied
to the public for domestic and industrial use be paid for by the
consumers.""10 But this is not true for much of the water provided rural to water users. If it is self-supplied as much of it is,
charges rarely have been levied on the volume pumped."'
Where some governmental or quasi-governmental body is
providing water for irrigation, institutional pressures have been
such that the water traditionally has been provided to the irrigators at only a fraction of its distribution and development
costs."12 Even American rural water utilities, which are supposed

structure) and the price of water. Indeed, for all uses except domestic, the
price should be the governing determinant of water use, other things being
equal. Unfortunately, most studies of water use and demand either have
not found statistically significant income and price effects or have not
looked for such effects and have reported needs rather than demands.
Id. at 263.
1' Legislation, supra note 2, at 415. (This is a worldwide survey as of 1985.).
Im Id. at 422 (This is frequently true for water supplied to urban consumers.).
109Id. at 410 (He then discusses "noteworthy exceptions" to this rule for domestic
(e.g., public water supply) and industrial abstractions.).
110Id. at 418.
.. S. CIRIAcY-WANTRUP, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS 79
(Bishop and Anderson, eds. 1985).
12 Legislation, supra note 2, at 418.
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to be unsubsidized, self-supporting enterprises, still operate on
the basis that water for rural users ought to be free or cheap.'
For American rural water utilities, subsidies have been almost
as concealed as they have been for publicly supplied irrigation
water in the United States. The economic health, however, of
most rural water utilities is no model for irrigation districts or
other entities providing water from either surface or groundwater
sources. 1 4 This is illustrated by a glance at the tricks employed
by rural water utilities to avoid paying for the costs of water
supplied, despite the requirement that they show an ability to be
self-financed.
Rural water users often have competing sources of supply
that are free, which both compels low rates and provides an
effective means of resisting rate increases." 5 The rural water
utilities finesse this revenue shortfall in several ways. They choose
not to build reserves (despite legal mandates that reserves be
maintained), not to provide for annual depreciation expense,
and not to have a sinking fund for any capital item's replacement. They anticipate that any future capital needs can be funded
by borrowing and particularly anticipate that they can roll over
the debt at low interest rates. Capital investments simply are
consumed by them; and they merrily proceed by expecting-and
getting-"penalty-free deferrals of debt service payments," by
receiving loans at below market rates, and by enjoying considerable tax exemption. "

6

The result is a present happiness bought in anticipation of a
long-run bailout at the expense of someone other than the cus"I Chicoine, Ramamurthy, & Grossman, The Collective Provision of Potable Water
to Rural Areas: Organization, Operating Cost and Demand Evidence from a Major U.S.
Cornbelt State, U.S.A., in WATER RESOURCES FOR RURAL AREAS AND THEIR CoMMarNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc., II, 965, 967 (1985)
[hereinafter Chicoine, Ramamurthy & Grossman]. Under the Reagan Administration
after 1981, the amount of subsidized capital was reduced for such entities. Id. at 965.
Because of the pricing policies followed by rural water districts . . . mar[T]o individual
ginal price may not be exogenous in the long run ....
During [this
customers in the short run, price will be exogenous ....
study], no rural water district altered its rates. Thus, for the purposes of
demand estimation, the price of water can be assumed exogenous.
Id. at 971.
'1

Gessaman, supra note 28, at II, 679.
at II, 671, 674.
at II, 674-78.

Id.
116 Id.
-
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tomers of rural water utilities, presumably the general federal
taxpayer.
[Cilear evidence [exists] that the customers of the rural water
systems . . . are not paying the full economic cost of the water
they receive. Even the most financially viable systems are...
consuming their capital. Some systems that . . . have not been
able to make their debt service payments have been collecting
only a small proportion of the economic cost of the water they
are delivering. In the short run, they can live on depreciation
and deferred maintenance and defaulted debt service payments.
infusions of public
In the long run, it will take substantial
7
funds to keep these systems operating."
A program, therefore, that has enjoyed in one fashion or another
a subsidy from the federal government alone of about thirty
percent of the money needed to build and operate it, anticipated
that in the future far greater expenditures will have to be spent
on its behalf."' The idea that water is not free or cheap to the
user dies a most reluctant death.
Insofar as the treatment of water as an economic good is
concerned the case of irrigation water is far more extreme. The
rural water utilities' operators seem frugal and foresighted by
comparison. For irrigators, water is so cheap in the United States
and most other countries that in many cases there are no social
19
or economic inducements to conserve.
Motives for conservation by irrigators, such as some kind of
incentive to make possible the sale of conserved water, must be
institutionally created. What happens to proposals for the expansion of seepage recovery systems, the improvement of onId. at II, 679.
Id. at II, 678. Interestingly enough, P. H. Gessaman concludes that these
programs give "clear evidence that the fundamental purpose of the program . . . is being
achieved at a reasonable [sic] level, though the cost of that achievement may not be
reasonable [sic]." Id.
"I R. Stavins & Z. Willey, Trading Conservation Investments for Water, in PRO"'

"'

CEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, REGIONAL AND STATE WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT, AsMRIcAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION 223 (Charbonneau & Popkin

eds. 1983) (They are writing about the Imperial Irrigation District, which gets its water
so cheaply that it has no economic incentive to conserve more than it did in the years
1973-83, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, which is afraid its
Colorado river supply will be drastically curtailed late in the 1980s.).
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farm irrigation techniques which use less water application and
more leach and tailwater, the lining of canals and laterals to
prevent seepage loss, the installing of electronic monitoring controls to assure flexible deliveries so as to avoid spillage when the
water is not needed? These proposals will never be undertaken
in the absence of incentives. 120 People rarely behave in ways that
are either altrustic or personally irrational.
There is no reason for the irrigator to assume a negotiation
stance for subsequent sales of conserved water when water is
sold initially so cheap. People must be made to realize that waste
is not ever cheap, except in terms of political subsidies, and
particularly water is not cheap when it is groundwater from
some aquifer like the Ogallala whose costs are pushed upon
future generations.'21 The continuation of such water policies is
nonsensical from both an ecologic and an economic viewpoint.
The metaphysical treatment of water-perhaps, especially
groundwater-is just all wrong under the traditional free, or
subsidized "cheap," goods view.
One might anticipate, this being so, that the rational efforts
of contemporary critics would succeed. The presence of nonsense
ought to be unbearable. But anticipations of this kind are doomed
to initial failure. And the reasons are no less rational than the
economic foundations upon which individual groundwater users
make their decisions.
Irrigators, who self-supply themselves through wells tapping
underground water strata, are regarded on almost a worldwide
basis as obtaining "free" water. 22 Other irrigators, who receive
their water through governmentally subsidized development and
distribution systems, get it so "cheaply" that expenditures for
water conservation of any kind are irrational on a personal basis,
however wise they may be socially or ecologically. 23 This has
120Id. at 225. The authors, one an economist for the Environmental Defense Fund,
are trying to negotiate a sale of conserved water that is worth it to both sides. Id. at
230.
121 E. Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, RESOURCES, no. 83, 4 (1986).
" TECLAFF, supra note 13, at 192.
12, Lee, PoliticalProvision of Water: An Economic/Public Choice Perspective, in
SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 51 (Corbridge, ed. 1983).
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been called "the success of failure."'12 4 "Perverse though it may
be, the more socially desirable it is to discard a policy the more
political support it is likely to receive. Political success is often
25
explained by economic failure."
In the case of subsidized irrigation water, the people who
perceive themselves as benefited by the program are, of course,
the farmers who receive the water. But beyond them are business
interests who buy from, sell to, loan to, and collect from these
farmers. And beyond these business interests are whole communities which have sprung up in what was arid space before
the subsidized irrigation project appeared. Often, these communities would be ghost towns if the subsidies stopped, irrigation
ceased, and the land reverted to its previous condition. The
bureaucrats whose jobs depend upon how much service they
supply and the politicians whose careers flourish because they
preserve their constituents' subsidies are among the groups with
a stake in this overall irrationality. Each one of these groups
would suffer a private loss if either the government policy of
subsidies or the legal structure providing for free self-supplied
26
water were changed.

Any attempt to turn the water system over to private, profitmotivated suppliers or to impose public charges commensurate
with the true cost of the water supplied, inevitably will be met
with vigorous resistance from all the beneficiaries of water sub-

sidized so as to seem free or cheap. Resistance to any pricing
equivalent to costs remain strong. Making "the desert bloom
like the rose" carries a considerable self-righteousness that has
12 7
proved politically useful.
Truly, though, the farmers who get the break from all of
this expenditure are the first ones who receive the subsidized
irrigation water. The farmer, who self-supplies from the ground,

1 Id. at 61. "Indeed . .. the more inefficient the policy the more difficult it is
politically to eliminate or modify it. . . .The more inefficent the government policy the
more it will distort economic decisions away from those which would be made in the
absence of the policy." Id.
"I Id. at 62. See 0. HERFINDAH. & A. KNEESE, QuALrTY OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
AN EcoNoMIc APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN UsING LAND, WATER AND AIR 86-90
(1965) (for a comparatively early study questioning traditional "pricing").
1 Lee, supra note 123, at 61-62.
,27Id.

at 61.
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has a continuing enjoyment of benefit from farm owner to farm
owner. The sole exception occurs if the sale price of the farm
declines to anticipation of aquifer exhaustion. But farm sales of
land receiving subsidized irrigation water never seem to anticipate either a reduction of water or an increase in price to the
level that supplying the water costs.
The value of the water subsidy gradually becomes capitalized
into the price of the farm land receiving it. As a result, later
owners receive only one benefit from the subsidy. And what is
that sole benefit? This sole benefit is the avoidance by these
later owners of a huge capital loss should the subsidy be discontinued. The situation is only somewhat less true for the nonfarmers who have been enjoying the indirect benefits. 128 Gordon
Tullock has called this "the transitional gains trap.'

1

29

As a

result, reform of any water subsidy program is made most
difficult politically.
Consequently, while it now is common to say that, "water
has become an economic good," and merely "a matter of economics and how much customers are willing to pay for water at
their location,"' 130 people see no reason to pay for what can be
obtained freely, nor to pay very much for what can be secured
at a nominal price. It has been said, "Americans once saw clean
and inexpensive water as a kind of national entitlement; the
resource, it seemed, was all but inexhaustible."'3 a This kind of
"entitlement" is by no means a matter of a long-past benefit
for many massive water uses and their users.

z Id. at 62.
But the farmer who purchases his land after the subsidy is in force will
pay for the value of the subsidy in the higher price he pays for his land.
Because of this capitalization farmers will soon quite legitimately come to
feel that they are entitled to the subsidy; after all they paid for it ...
[a]nd the larger and more distorting the subsidy the more farmers will lose
from its termination and the more political resistance any termination will
confront. Id.
,29
The gains are transitional because
the gains will soon be competed away and the end results will be that no
one is receiving a clear benefit .... But even without positive benefits
from water subsidies, the losses that would be imposed if [water subsidies]
were eliminated makes it very difficult politically to eradicate them.
Lee, supra note 123, at 63.
130 Chicoine, Ramamurthy, & Grossman, supra note 113, at II, 969.
"I Price, A Water Crisis?, RESOURCES, no. 83, 1 (1986).
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Any valuable good that is available at no or absurdly low cost
will generate high, perhaps insatiable, demand, and that is the
case with water. When the quantity demanded outstrips the
quantity supplied, as is true nearly everywhere in the [American] West, consumers must be given a reason-an economic
incentive-to curtail use. Put bluntly, most farmers, households, and industries will not conserve until prices force them
13 2
to do So.
Politically, it seems easier to follow the traditional views
toward water. Under that limited view, projections from current
levels of water use become "requirements that must be met,
regardless of cost . . . [through] capital-intensive projects."' 3 3
Suppose that the Ogallala aquifer has been mined, so that the
High Plains seems to be running short of water. What then?
Just plan for an interbasin transfer at federal taxpayer expense
for the perfect solution. 3 4 The need that such "large-scale water
diversions demonstrate[ ] [for] a long time period ... for the
necessary engineering, economic, financial, social and environmental planning and feasibility studies and to achieve the political consensus required to move such projects to fruition,"
becomes a part of the "required" cost structure mobilized to
35
meet water "demand." 1
Water resouces provide a general example of the refusal by
decision makers to recognize scarcity value. This results in steadily increasing water "shortages" because failing to price water

Frederick, The Legacy of Cheap Water,
"I Id. at 2.
131

13.

Id.

RESOURCES

no. 83, 3 (1986).

Id.

In several areas of the West, renewable water supplies cannot keep pace
with growing levels of consumption; even in the comparatively well-watered
East, demand is bumping up against supply.... Under the combined
pressure of growing demand, deteriorating quality, and higher values and
therefore costs, the traditional, supply-oriented approach to water problems
is foundering.

'Id GREGG, supra note 4, at 295. He proposes the possibility of interbasin transfers
for replacing the mined Ogallala aquifer. He asks, "Isthere a federal interest in making
a participatory commitment now for that time frame in order to maintain the food and
fiber production of the region?" He goes on to admit, "The gains resulting from any
regional alternative approach . . . to the solution of water problems of the High Plains
would not be distributed evenly among all those who might achieve some gain." Id. at
295-96.
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in relation to its value produces excessive extraction and consumption.'3 6 Meeting costs comes to mean simply calculating
price in relation to the money that must be spent in the extraction, treatment, and distribution of water, without regard to
pricing the water in relation to its economic scarcity. 31 7 The focus
is almost entirely upon physical problems-in the case of groundwater, on such problems as salt water intrusion, surface subsidence, and aquifer impaction. 138 All decision makers, who began
by considering water as a resource to be freely accessed or who
subsidized it so that water could be a cheap commodity, found
themselves faced with strong political resistance to imposing a
price or raising the previously underpriced sales figures. 13 9
On the other hand, humanity's small experience shows that
water use declines with a rise in price, even though water demand
is, relative to other commodities, price inelastic. That is, a ten
percent increase in price, while producing a drop in the demand
for water, causes the demand to drop by only one and one-half
percent to one and one-half percent to seven percent. 14° The
reduction, however, is worth the effort of higher prices. Simply
metering for water use, even when charges per unit are not cost
equivalent, produces a permanent downward adjustment in water

36

Moncur & Pollock, Scarcity Rents for Water: A Valuation and Pricing Model,

64 LAND ECONOMICS 62 (1988).
" Id. Costs are not seen in relation to the scarcity value of water at all but only
to use costs, while payment for water is often not even expressed in cash terms. See
Drinking-Water and Sanitation, 1981-1990: A Way to Health, A WHO Contribution to
the InternationalDrinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, 1981, 14-15. The use
of "unweighted unit-consumptive-use values" seems preferred, G. DAVIS, WATER AND
ENERGY: DEMAND AND EFFECTS, 125 (1985) (prepared for the International Hydrological
Programme by the United States National Committee on Scientific Hydrology) (UNESCO
1985). It seems enough that "rational water management . . . should be founded upon
a thorough understanding of water availability and movement." Id. at V.
" Moncur & Pollock, supra note 136, at 71. This seems reinforced by the elaborate,
nation-by-nation groundwater study done for the Commission of the European Communities. See J. FRIED, GROUNDWATER RESOURCES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY SYNTHETICAL REPORT (1982) (particularly the introduction by A. Andreopoulos).
Rogers, supra note 106, at 297.
,, "Price is expected to influence the demand for water negatively - that is, prices
lead to lower consumption; in economic terms, this means that the price elasticity is
negative. The studies of water demand mostly agree with the expectation of a negative
price relationship with consumer demand." Id. at 264.
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use.'4 1 Metering alone, therefore, would moderate water "demand" through upward price adjustments.
Imposing reasonably adequate prices covering the costs of
providing water to preserve aquifers from destruction by pumping have the minimal advantage of moving public attention away
from the fixed "need" for water-whether per acre, or per
capita, or per industry. Once water is neither free nor nominally
priced to its users, these previously privileged water users will
choose to act in a more conserving mode. What was before not
worth doing will become worthwhile. What before was a physical
"need" for more and more water will become an economic and
42
technical ability to lower water use.
The small amount of existing experience shows that as the
price of water increases, demand for water declines sharply. As
yet, not enough is known about the level to which any ultimate
"economic demand for water" could fall in what economists
would regard as a rational system. 143 However, we should realize
that there is no fixed physical "need" for water beyond the
comparatively trifling requirements of the human body.
Nevertheless, despite pricing at cost as a way to achieve
predicted water savings, this metaphysical method of managing
water seems so much less "real" to water users and planners
under the traditional systems. The physical presence of water
engineering projects is what seems "for real" to most people.
Water gushing from a tube in the ground or water being delivered to support directly some human use contribute to the belief
that a physically fixed "need" for water exists. Most people
remain reluctant to accept "need" as a metaphysical product of
economics, social expectations, and legal-institutional systems.
Gaining acceptance for this untraditional definition of "need"
relative to water clearly will not be an easy task.

Id. at 264.
' Id. at 294-95.
"[RIational water-pricing policies would have the largest potential impact of all
government policies. Not only would rational policies lead to conserving water in current
uses, they would also lead to reassessment of the wisdom of carrying out that particular
activity at all." Id. at 267 and 296-97.
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SOVEREIGN FUNCTION AND MORAL CHOICE RELATIVE TO

LEGISLATIVE ACTION FOR GROUNDWATER AND AQUIFERS

Since 1970, central state authorities have been increasing
rural land use controls. At the same time, the role of the federal
government has grown in rural land use control.'" As one example, the United States Army Corps of Engineers has obtained
jurisdiction over wetlands. 145 Perhaps, too, Congress finally has
gotten serious over non-point source pollution.' 46 Federal controls over land, streams, groundwater, and agricultural husbandry seem bound to increase greatly, with profound, hard-tolimit federal and state governmental interventions in agriculture,
4
rural land ownership, and any private rights in groundwater.1 1

-, See LAND-USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 963-88 (R. Ellickson & A.
Tarlock eds. 1981); 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WATER POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS WASTES,
213-15 (J.Battle ed. 1986).
145Myers, Introduction: Agriculture and Property, 34 KAN. L. REV. 411, 415-18
(1985-86). The Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation and Reserve Program Act has
soil conservation provisions which have been seen as
a symbolic turning point in farmland conservation at the federal level ...
orchestrated by a complex mix of urban, suburban, and rural interests as
well as environmental groups that could signal the beginning of a new
coalition for similar measures . . . a significant first step toward a program
of effective federal involvement in soil conservation.
Id. at 418 (citing Malone, A Historical Essay on the Conservation Provisions of the
1985 Farm Bill: Sodbusting, Swampbusting, and the Conservation Reserve, 34 KAN. L.
REV. 577). See Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1201-1245, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801-45 (Supp. 1988)). For the use of these conservation easements to
relieve delinquent farm borrowers by exchanging a grant of easements for cancellation
of debt, see 4 AGRICULTURE LAW UPDATE, no. 6, no. 42 (entire), 1 (1987).
" Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1987). (This program for nonpoint source pollution existed previously under section 208 and section 205(j), a later
addition, of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1982)). (This 1987 legislation was
passed over the veto of President Reagan.). R. Portney, Environmental Legislation in
the Ninety-ninth Congress, RESOURCES, no. 86, 8 (1987).

Portney finds the new bill

"exhortation" and fears for its future implications:
If such assistance blossoms into a subsidy program of the kind created to
finance sewage treatment plants over the last fifteen years, it would be
unfortunate .... [to have] [alsa result ...
[similar] indeterminate effects
on water quality in spite of the $30 billion or so that has been spent [on
the sewage treatment plants of municipalities].
Id. at 9. Perhaps there were some objective, economic reasons for President Reagan's
two vetoes of this act.
"I Peskin, Nonpoint Pollution and NationalResponsibility, RESOURCES, no. 83, 10
(1986). Even state-wide efforts are shown by modeling to be insufficient. Federally
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Some market proponents lament the employment of "traditional planning and land-use control tools" by either the state
or federal governments that would "embark on a massive planning and farmland preservation strategy."14 But even these critics are very doubtful whether they can prevent the broad
49
implementation of centrally directed state controls on rural land. 1
If that should be true for rural land which until recently was
regarded as substantially an unregulated real property interest,
establishing fixed, enforceable, and transferable property interests in groundwater in its aquifer-as one example of a water
right-may expect even more resistance.
Large numbers of people will probably continue to urge that
the law does enough when it requires users of water to use water
"reasonably." The discretion in courts and administrators, which
is lamented by market proponents in their preference for independent fixed water rights, is preferred by others.150 Under the
reasonable use concept, administrators and courts have the discretion to decide reasonableness. They often exercise their dis-

mandated interstate programs - in the absence of regional, river basin program - will
be needed. Id. at 11. There are constitutional implications in comprehensive federal
preemption of all water law. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), at 958-60.
,,1 Delogu, A Comprehensive State and Local Government Land Use Control
Strategy to Preserve the Nation's Farmland is Unnecessary and Unwise, 34 KAN. L.
REV. 519, 533 (1985-86). An earlier well-known attack on centralized decision-making
in land-use controls is Ellickson, Ticket to Thermidor: A Commentary on the Proposed
California Coastal Plan, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 715 (1975-76).
,49 Delogu, supra note 148, 537-38. The criticism has neither cut short the longevity
of land-use controls nor affected the belief in their wisdom on behalf of their proponents.
See Meyers, supra note 145, at 416.
, T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 90-91 (1983). Quoting Steven F. Williams: "At every stage of the (regulation) procedure, we see government
agencies exercising enormous discretion ....
This vast discretion has three dangerous
facets: it is an occasion for influence-peddling, it breeds unfairness, and it erodes the
rule of law." Id. See also Hirshleifer, Forward, in WATER RIGHrs: SCARCE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, (Anderson ed. (1983)):
But in a populist era the idea of anyone having exclusive rights seems like
an offense against the public. And in an activist age, the solution to be
feared is subjecting all uses to the whim of a supervisory agency rather
than to the even-handed enforcement of carefully defined property rights.
When commissions or courts license... with tenure contingent upon...
some ill-defined notion such as serving the public good, the result is a
grossly inefficient allocation of water resources.
The lamentations might not be so strong if what they lamented were so firmly placed
in groundwater tradition.

19881

GROUNDWATER AND AQUIFERS

cretionary powers over a protracted period of time by either
reversing or reinstating decisions that have reached a "reasonableness" conclusion in a particular situation. "Tenure can change
at any time and owners can lose their apparent rights without
any compensation."' 5 1
Compared to a system that determines property rights through
the discretionary acts of judges and regulators, market advocates
prefer independent fixed property rights. The defects in markets,
including their failure, are trifling alongside a discretionary system. Market proponents abhor a dependency upon the meaning
of "reasonableness," whereby its meaning is determined after a
particular water situation has erupted into controversy. 5 2 The
discretionary water regime, however, has its defenders. Market
proponents are not the only contemporary advocates in the field
of groundwater law.
The sovereign's role is, at the least, one of service for private
property interests in groundwater. After all, the sovereign may
be, in addition, a public trustee of groundwater. The sovereign,
beyond this, may be the source of the delegation of the ability
to own any property in land or any water source. This is certainly
true under most current legal theories. Disagreement with this
view exists among a minority, most of whom are natural law
proponents. They argue that property "precedes" and is "higher"
than any sovereign. Still, practically speaking today, the sovereign can take all property unto itself, even under the United
States Constitution if due process is satisfied.' 53
But what if the sovereign has chosen to allow private property in a natural resource or to allow its own instrumentalities
to identify such property as individual to them? In these cases,
the sovereign likely would work best at resource specification, if
the sovereign recognized the impact of market forces in property
allocations. One need not advocate a pure market system in
order to believe in the value of legal regimes accommodating
markets.
ANDERSON,
52

supra note 150, at 99 (groundwater has doubtful tenure rights).

Id. at 34.

, St. Augustine may have been the first Christian theologian to assert this position,
but he was followed by many more. See THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE
160-61, 229-31 (H. Paolucci ed. 1962). The American constitutional position is well
summarized in Keystone Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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Resources the sovereign puts into defining and enforcing
property rights are public investments. They finance the turning
of natural phenomena into natural resources and the carving of
54
inchoate sovereignty into specific units of economic power.' If

the costs are too high, the returns to the sovereign diminishing,
and the private property interest subject to subsequent diminution, individuals will spurn such rights and the sovereign will
have invested in their creation in vain. The individual would
seek in lieu of so insecure an interest a return from some other
source capable of financing at others' expense the financial
advantage derivable from the conditioned property right.'
In air and water pollution matters, the definition and enforcement of private property rights have seemed too costly for
most enforcers and investors alike. Private property rights have
played a subordinate role to command regulation in dealing with
air and water quality correction.'5 6 The sovereign seems to have
kept too many natural resources in its inchoate self, subject only
to sovereign discretionary command regulation.'
Yet when charge systems are put in place "at which the
marginal cost of pollution is slightly greater than the marginal
cost of pollution control," air and water quality enhancing
measures should result from these cost-saving purposes. Money
can be raised through these charges for the public treasury, either
for the general fund or for correcting the damage from taxed
activity. Under the theory of charges, the harm should be more
rapidly reduced compared to the effectiveness of command regulations alone.'5 8

supra note 111, at 221-22.
5 ANDERSON, supra note 150, at 25. "[Wlhen the probability of capturing benefits
from a use is low, it is less likely that the owner will devote that resource to that use."
Id. at 18. He continues: "What happens when private property rights do not exist? . . .
The entrepreneur continually searches for opportunities to generate returns above opportunity costs or rents . . . . [T]he entrepreneur does not care whether he is creating a
free lunch or dining at someone else's expense." Id. at 19.
" CIRIAcY-WANTRUP,

,16 Id.
'"

at 85.

supra note 111, at 67-71.
Fano, Brewster, & Thompson, article in WATER REsouRcEs
CIRIACY-WANTRUP,

FOR RURAL AREAS

AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, VTH WORLD CONGRESS OF INT'L WATER RESOURCES Assoc. II,

650 (1985). Though a charge scheme, it is shown to operate very much like a property
system. Id. at II, 655-69.
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An example of what happens, according to many economists,
when the sovereign turns an aspect of its sovereignty into property, can be found in the institution of emission credits concerning air and water pollution. The sovereign can be indifferent to
the quality of air and water or leave the quality to private
nuisance or other actions. Conversely, the sovereign can set
standards to be enforced by sovereign commands, with the aspect
of air and water quality still within sovereignty's inchoate form.
More innovatively, the sovereign can turn the quality of air
and water into property units to be commoditized, traded in the
market, and treated like any other specific natural resource
capable of individual ownership. By permitting the development
of additional forms of property, what was once a natural phenomenon is turned into a natural resource. 5 9 In the case of air
and water quality, however, the task is far more daunting than
is the proposed commodization of groundwater while still confined in an aquifer.
The property rights in emission credits (which go a stage
beyond the charge system as a property right) are said to lower
compliance cost, quicken compliance, and permit movement to
still better ambient conditions. 16° Once the property rights have
been created in this regard and despite the history of the sovereign being unable to attract support for such property systems
in the past, emission credits have worked positively in conserving
the subject matter of the new property rights. 61 Better definitions
have been sought by those who can derive a benefit from such
property once its exclusivity, fixity, enforceability, and transferability have been created by the sovereign through the legal sys-

tem. 162

" See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 361-69 (Findley & Farber eds., 2d ed. 1985).
, T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONs TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION

POLICY, 188-89, 200 (1985). It is too early to determine if such a program retards, or
enhances, enforcement of the goals, though the chance of attaining them will prove to
be enhanced. Id. at 189. The need to overlay the program upon a command-and-control
structure had diminished the effectiveness of the property-rights approach, Id. at 214.
See also R. LrroFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOn. AND TROUBLE OF
EPA's BUBBLE (1986).
161HAHN & HESTER, The Market for Bads: EPA 's Experience with Emissions
Trading, REGULATION Nos. 3/4, 48 (1987).
161 ANDERSON, supra note 150, at 25.
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At that point, the argument runs, people will be content with
the individualized benefits of the property right. They no longer
will have rational reasons for seeking further transfers from the
general taxpayer or third parties or the environment as was the
case when the values rested either in nature or in the sovereign.63
Through commodization, a conservation effect will follow whether
the commodity is a unit of air quality, aquifer water, or other
formerly non-specific element. Thus, we are assured that the
sovereign, if it wants environmental protection, has the choice of
either command regulation or continuing the non-specificity of an
unidentified aspect of a natural resource within an inchoate sovereignty. 164
The hostility to an independent fixed property rights approach
to natural phenomena is very strong. Commoditicizing these phenomena for market trading is abhorrent to many who prefer
sovereign command regulation. In the case of pollution trading
credits, Tom Tietenberg has said, "the notion that firms should
have a property right in surplus emission reductions was not a
part of the command-and-control system ....
[C]onfiscation of
created credits is a distinct possibility, destroying much of the
incentive to create additional emission reductions.' 165
The same is true for property rights in groundwater or
surface-water that rest upon "reasonableness" especially where
the reassignment of priorities is required to achieve "fairness"
or some other intervention is mandated in the "public interest."
However credible the purpose of such interventions, they serve

163

Id. at 26-34.

I" W.

RAMSAY

&

C.

ANDERSON,

MANAGING

THE ENVIRONMENT:

AN

ECONOMIC

PRIMER, 253-81 (1972). The authors claim that this is a resource specifying and marginal-

price approach particularly advantageous to both capital-market and socialist profitmotivated systems. Id. at 49-50. The West German environmental administrator, Eberhard Bohne, has studied closely the USEPA air emissions' reduction credits program.
As a result, he has reached views different to a substantial degree from those of
Tietenberg. Supra note 160. His views are set forth in a report to the Ministry of
Environment, Nature Protection, and Reactor Security of the Federal Republic of
Germany, early drafts of which he has been kind enough to allow his author to read.
See E. Bohne, Politics and Markets in Environmental Protection, in REPORT TO THE
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES 137-39 (1987).
165 TIETENBERG, supra note 160, at 215. (Some economists also have opposed
"property rights in pollution."). L. HINES, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: POPULATION, POLLUTION AND ECONOMICS, 246-48 (1973).
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to prevent definition of value in the property right held and to
prevent the efforts of the rights' holder to maximize profit.
These intervening rules act through non-market controls in a nolonger-so-private right which has been converted into a public
resource. ,66
Some critics, however, find that the property rights approach
to subjects such as water is essentially amoral, akin to taking
human life in order to neutrally, objectively, and amorally protect property rights.' 67 These people continue to think that "if
we're really going to move forward in our land ethic to become
a community of humans in harmony with nature, we also must
think very closely about our whole tradition of private property. ' 1 6 For many believers in an environmental ethic, fixed
private property rights in renewable resources are not the help
to humanity and nature that, say, the Austrian and Chicago
Schools of economists assign them.
Moral judgments are not exclusive to life-and-death situations.
A less dramatic example would be an economic proposal for
dealing with environmental pollution by implementing a system
of licenses to pollute. Purchasing a license would create a
personal property right to pollute .... Theoretically, various
polluters could compete for licenses in an action, internalizing
the cost of polluting and thereby creating incentives for indus69
try to reduce pollution in the interest of increasing profits.
At this point, the author simply sounds like other writers
who would substitute the property rights system in resources in

' Cuzan, Appropriators versus Expropriators:The PoliticalEconomy of Water in
the West, WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 13, 28-32 (Anderson ed. 1983).
,67Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights - The Need for Moral

Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OIno ST. L.J. 163,
174 (1986). Malloy makes it clear that he rejects the Austrian and Chicago Schools, with

their belief in the value of the free market in commoditizing this natural phenomenon.
Id. at 163-64. He notes, however, that neither Milton Friedman of the Chicago School
nor Friedrich Hayek of the Austrian School reject "the need to inject moral judgment
and guidance into economic analysis." Id. at 174-75.
' Donald Worster, in Ethics and the Land, 6 AMERICAN LAND FORUM no. 3, 17,
27 (1986).
"I Malloy, supra note 167, at 175. Malloy also discusses the administrative problems
of implementing such a property scheme claiming that "[m]ost economists would probably admit to the difficulty of implementing this regulatory system."

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

place of the command regulation approach with the exception,
perhaps, that the just quoted argument claims that increase of
profits is the primary purpose of instituting a property system.
However, an increase in profits, according to the standard proponents of independent property rights in pollution, is the least
of the reasons for switching to such a system. 10
But then the moral argument concerning renewable resources
veers into another direction altogether. The moralist takes the
position that licensing pollution is like licensing rape or mugging.
"[Tihe fact that polluters pay for the license does not obviate
the danger to human life posed by pollution.'

17

'

In brief, many environmental moralists accuse those who
propose charge systems, trading credits, or other independent
fixed property rights that would commoditize resources such as
the quality of air and water of being immoral and criminal.
Implicitly, that allocation of water for human needs as a private
property would fall under the same moral interdict. Under this
interdict, the preference of those who would further commoditize
and propertize nature would be required to undertake a subsequent reordering. Environmentalists who take this view assert
that too many market and property proponents:
reject the right of all people to enjoy life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, they . . .affront strongly
held moral values and suggest policy directives so contrary to
the normative values of the society that both the economic

11oTIETENBERG, supra note 160, at 188-202. Tietenberg considers profit only as a
subordinate function of cost-effectiveness in attaining quicker, cheaper compliance. He
points out that under the command regulation system, industry has "[tihe costs of
compliance [that] include not only the control costs, but also the costs of seeking relaxed
standards through lobbying and litigation .. .includ[ing] the resources committed to
negotiation or legal defense as well as the payments required by any monetary sanctions
imposed." Id. at 184. Such conflicts and motives do not disappear in a property rights
system. The proponents of the French basin-wide charge system argue that a mediator
should be maintained to sustain a "meneur de jeu," (leader of the game) primarily by
carrying information among the participants so that they will know where the best
interests lie for the property rights in dispute. Delavalle, Gendrin, Davigo, & Ollognon,
supra note 20, at 243-44.
"I'Malloy, supra note 167, at 175. Economic analysis can be "a useful tool in
evaluating law and social policy," but "some problems cannot be reduced to calculable
form" and property rights and market trades must be overriden by "considerations of
right, wrong, and the dignity of human life." Id. at 176.
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system and the legal system capable of reaching such conclu-

sions are discredited.

72

Environmental advocates abound who find this intolerable, even
as a possibility.
On their own behalf, the economists who have been attacked
do not deny the importance of choice, moral value, social preferences, or however such matters are denominated. Nor do they
argue that such choices are non-economic decisions. 73 As they
put it, "neither optimality nor efficiency is strictly a technical
issue ... at least for starting points, on moral judgments about
who should have what rights. After that decision has been made,
' 74
they depend on subjective evaluations of benefits and costs.'

172

Id. at 177. The view is not idiosyncratic. See T. O'RioRDAN, ENVIRONMENTALISM

(2d ed. 1981) (summaries of views). Many environmentalists fear "the use of economic
logic for environmental regulation." W. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND
POLICY 294 (1985). As Duncan Kennedy notes, these sorts of views may well be a part
of movements that want to "blur the lines between . . . 'public' and 'private' enterprise....." Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, 36 J. OF LEG.
EDUC. 518, 520 (1986) "to chip away ... at the owner's power," Id. at 525; that ask
"whether there should be any private rights at all in mechanisms of interstate commerce," Id. at 534; that say, "In Shelley v. Kramer ... the private sphere 'disappears,'
since all private arrangements are dependent for their structure on enforcement of private
law ground rules," Id. at 541; that claim "the notion of correctness, at least as we
usually use the word in math or science or logic, just isn't applicable," Id. at 561; and
that assert "professional knowledge of the nature of law .. .[is a claim] just made up
out of whole cloth," Id. at 562. Private property, among these critics, simply is not the
secure concept that a reader might find in the writings of proponents for the market,
propertization, and commoditization.
"I Anderson, Introduction to WHY Do WE STILL HAVE AN ECOLOGICAL CRISIS? 1,
1-3 (Armstrong ed. 1972).
17, Anderson, supra note 150, at 87 n. 24. Terry Anderson seems sufficiently close
to the views of Gordon Tullock, whom Malloy quotes as one of the proponents of the
"amoral economist" that Anderson's views should not be regarded as untypical of
Austrian or Chicago school economists on this point. Malloy, supra note 167, at 168.
Alan Randall, an agricultural economist, believes that:
Institutional economists ... are more apt than those of the neoclassical
tradition - most closely associated with cost-benefit analysis - to recognize the multiple objectives associated with environmental policy, including
equity and distributional issues, and to examine the role of culture, laws,
and the process of collective decision making in the formation of policy.
[There is] the impossibility of reconciling the two perspectives ....
Environment: New Concerns in Farm Policy, RESOURCES no. 84, 17 (1986) (summarizing
Randall's remarks at Conference on Agriculture and the Environment, April 21, 22, 1986).
The Austrian and Chicago schools, as well as the Marshallians, probably are included
among those in the "neoclassical tradition," who are accused by moralists and institutional
economists alike of lacking sufficient values-or, maybe, just the "right" values.
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The difference between the "moralist" and the "economist"
lies in the location of the decision and the impact of the subsequent evaluations. Once a property right has been defined and
the terms for enforcement and transferability are set forth in
that initial definition, the economist claims that the right should
be allowed to operate in the market only under predictable
constraints previously laid down by the law to guide decisions
by potential investors. 175 Subsequent unpredictable notions of
"efficiency," "reasonableness," or "fairness" on the part of
administrators and judges acting on the public behalf should not
affect the tenure of the property.
Assuming that the property right in groundwater has been
defined so as to compel its property holders to "face the full
opportunity costs of their actions, [so that] they will take only
those actions that produce positive net benefits for themselves
and for society . . " many economists would then argue that
the law has done enough. 76 Such a statement has all the morality
of Aristotle's commercial or commutative justice. But then the
theologians have always accused Aristotle himself of propounding
1 77
a system that did not "allow for any real moral obligation.'
The choice of underlying values, therefore, cannot be avoided
by an informed decision maker, moralist or economist. The
choice of values is present even in incremental decisions. For
example, choice of values inheres in the decision that must be
made with regard to old rights in groundwater when new property rights in the water are set up. The decision has to be made
whether or not to fold old rights into a new system, keep them
in effect in grandfathered autonomy, or abolish them. The choice,
whatever it may be, requires the wise decision maker to define
these old rights. Only the lazy and feckless decision maker
chooses some ambiguous allocation to some future time, in some
7
future dispute, to make some future determination.
"I

Fractor, Privatizingthe Ground Water Resource: Individual Use and Alternative

Specifications, 24 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 405, 410 (1988).
116 ANDERSON, supra note 150, at 17.

"' See generally F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PmLOSOPHY I, IV-V (1985). Aristotle,
of course, has also been attacked by environmentalists for his mechanistic view of nature
inherent in his first principle of logic. C. MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN,
ECOLOGY, AND THE SCENTIFIc REVOLUTION 229 (1980).

"I'TECLAi, supra note 13, at 181. "Laws that assimilate pre-existing uses into the
new system after a grace period represent the modern trend in water law." Id.
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At the very beginning of any newly created rights, a decision
should be made concerning the assimilation of old rights. In this
way, they can become the equivalent of the new rights in the
changed system. Some grace period for assimilation may be
needed. The worst choice, though, is to try to leave old rights
in place permanently unaffected by change, side by side with the
new rights. 79
The institution of an independent fixed property rights system in groundwater will require value decisions concerning old
water rights. This will be the case especially if heavy investments
in money, time, and labor have been made in rights under the
previous system. 8 0 Certainly, if a jurisdiction moves from a
reasonable use or absolute dominion rule to one that establishes
independent property rights for groundwater in terms of surface
land owned or water pumped, certain previous groundwater
users will seek recognition for what they will insist are preexisting
rights. Provision-as in Vernon Smith's and the New Mexicans'
82
proposed schemes' 8-must be made for them.'
The initial reasons in the United States for the preservation
of the values in old water rights would be constitutional. Yet in
the United States there ultimately must be social, economic, and
political reasons as well for preserving the old values. These
reasons would be the same as in other countries, particularly, if
a revolution were in progress concerning all property interests.
Decision makers may be making only incremental decisions
when implementing the value choices between old and new prop-

179 Id. at 180. "Laws that leave pre-existing uses unaffected by a new regime may
bring about a complicated and inefficient situation, in which different regimes apply to
the same source of water." Id.
110Id. at 180.
The quest for efficiency in utilization of scarce water resources may require
that cancellation of many existing uses, in order, so far as is practicable,
to begin anew with a system that more adequately protects the public
interest. . . . [T]he sudden abolition of existing uses would cause economic
hardship and uncertainty. The question then becomes: what new elements
should be introduced and which old elements should be retained? Id.
, Smith, Water Deeds: A Proposed Solution to the Water Valuation Problem, 26
ARIZONA REvIEw, no. 1, 7 (1977); and New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute
and the Univ. of New Mexico Law School, STATE APPROPRIATION OF UNAPPROPRIATED
GROUNDWATER: STRATEGY FOR INSURING NEW MEXICO A WATER FUTURE 17 (1986).
82 See TECLAFF, supra note 13, at 7.

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:49

erty rights. But they also may be doing far more. History reveals
that in making choices like these whole political systems have
found their justification for existence. 183
The extent to which any old water interests are preserved,
and the length of any grace period for converting them to a new
right, depend upon the values the new system of property rights
is to serve. Some economic losses for users under the old regime
can be expected. After all, change would be unlikely if the old
system had worked to general satisfaction.
Under the appropriation doctrine, for example, appropriators tend to claim a greater application of water for beneficial
use than is really the case in order to protect the amount of
water they do apply.' 4 Thus under a new property system appropriators may get less water than before. They may have to
take water of a different quality; they may have to change the
nature of delivery; they may have to change uses; or they may

5
lose control over the return flow.1
Only the greater specificity, enforceability, and transferability of any new property right in water for affected appropriators
make deprivations by law of old legal rights economically as
well as politically bearable. This superiority in the new property
right is required if the change is to be constitutional under a
government that can neither expropriate without compensation
nor fail to offer constitutionally protected administrative pro-

cedures. 186

"I This has been asserted about "hydraulic civilizations,"
at any rate. See K.
WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN TOTAL POWER (1957).
,Se &e TECLAFF, supra note 13, at 189-90.
See Id. at 191; 187-88.
'6 ANDERSON, supra note 146, at 13. "The problem of third-party impairment due
to alterations in return flows can all but be eliminated by defining water rights in terms
of consumption rather than diversion [or pumping when reinjection is present] ....
By
reducing the consumptive use coefficient, the owner can free up water to be used
elsewhere." Id. at 66-67. Constitutionally protected administrative procedure in the
United States is sometimes called "the new property," C. Donahue Jr., The Future of
the Concept of Property Predicted From Its Past, Pennock & Chapman 22 NoMos 286
(eds. 1980). For constitutionally protected administrative procedures, denominated as
"liberty interests," see Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, (1985).
Statutorily created and protected administrative procedures also exist at the federal level.
See School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 1913 (1987).
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GUARANTEEING SUSTAINABILITY OF RENEWABLE AQUIFERS
AND CONTINUING GROUNDWATER FUNCTIONS

A preliminary choice of values before any legal-institutional
decision is taken is, therefore, unavoidable. The choice must be7
8
made deliberately and not left to decision by drift and apathy.
This is certainly true when some basic decision is made to
conserve or enhance the condition of some resource such as
groundwater quantity or quality. It is just as true when an
instrumental choice is made to implement that improvement as
for example by folding in old, existing, and uncertain, groundwater rights into any new system of independent fixed water
rights. 18 8 The decision as to values is both basic and instrumental
when the choice is whether to rely on command regulations or
on a system of independent fixed property rights, or on a mix
of both in groundwater law.
Those who would commoditize water in aquifers, even up to
allowing injection rights of wastes into aquifers, seem to have
just as much a grasp of natural values concerning groundwater
as do those who would resist such action and who prefer the
sovereign's command regulation. The ultimate value issue in any
choice depends on what better serves the protection and preservation of groundwater. Will it be through property rights or the
command regulation concept or a mix of them?
In the case of groundwater, aside from maintaining the
sustainability of the aquifers, what other general choices based
on value are there? 1' 9 If legal systems merely opt out, all groundwater would be mined without replenishment. Nor, in all likelihood, would the tough choice of "water today, dearth tomorrow"
ever be replaced with regimes of sustainability.
What is needed in the case of flow resources, such as groundwater, is a legal system-whether one of independent fixed property rights, command regulation, or both-that would let the
resource be used within the limits of its sustainability relative to

"ISee J. HURST, LAw AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1960).
"[Clonscious direction and invention are bound to be marginal. This has various features, but they all favor drift over direction." Id. at 68.
s See TECLAFF, supra note 13, at 180.
"'

See S. BRUBAKER, IN COMMAND OF ToMoRRow: RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL

STATEGIES FOR AMERICANS 17 (1975).
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human demand.'19 Robert Repetto compares this to John Locke's
limitation upon property claims that would leave "as much and
as good for others"' 91 and with the accountant's theoretical
concept of income, that is, "the greatest amount that can be
consumed in the current period without reducing prospects for
consumption in the future."1 92
This is also the goal of persons who would have flow resources administered directly from a moral basis.' 93 Such state
actions as Arizona's groundwater preservation strategy also have
this as their goal. Arizona's strategy will use regulation and
water replacement charges to achieve stability in groundwater by
2025.'94 The goal is also the same for those calling for a property
system in water which would reach such a result by the owner's
self-benefiting actions. 95
There are also those who have no such goal. These "realists"
take a different moral position from either the commoditizer of
nature or those opposing commoditization. These "optimists"
believe that nature can accommodate human demand without
such elaborate precautions because the economy, society, and
politics will always automatically adjust supply and demand so
196
that sustainability is unlikely to be lost.

"9

REPETTO,

supra note 35, at 16.

,9 Id. This passage doubtless refers to J.LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GovERNMENT

Bk. 11, § 31, 131 ("Nothing was made by God for man to spoil

Or

destroy"),

33 (Repetto's identical quotation), and § 46 (1690).
19 REPETTO, supra note 35, at 16.
193 See Malloy, supra note 167, at 175. (Malloy might argue that some part of flow
resources are beyond certain uses even if sustainability of the flow resource were
possible). See also MERCHANT, supra note 177, at 236-52. Interestingly, the concept of
a balanced maintenance has been applied even to wilderness areas in the United States.

K. HAUGRUD AND THE STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, WILDERNESS PRESER-

A GUIDE TO WILDERNESS SELECTION 64-78, 81-85 (1985).
See FERRIS, Water Demand - Sharing a Limited Resource, 4 HYDATA no. 5, 69 (1980); FERRIS, The Arizona Groundwater Code: A Model of Strength in Compromise
in WATER MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION, A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE FRESHWATER FOUNDATION 39, 40, 44 (1985).
95 See ANDERSON, supra note 150, at 25. "[Pleople will devote their efforts to
defining and enforcing the rules as long as their perceived additional benefits from doing
so exceed their perceived additional costs. In this sense, establishing and protecting
property rights is productive activity toward which resources can and will be devoted."
,9 Beckerman, The Myth of 'Finite' Resources, BusINEss AND SOCIETY REVIEW,
no. 12; 21, 25 (1974-75). See also E. MuRPHY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL BALANCE
186-96 (1980) (discussing similar views).
VATION:
"
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And if sustainability should be lost? The economist Wilfred
Beckerman answers the question for us.
Furthermore, suppose that, as a result of using up all the
world's resources, human life did come to an end. So what?
What is so desirable about an indefinite continuation of the
human species .... [T]o ensure that successive generations of
into this world is not so
people must indefinitely be brought
97
obviously a big deal for anybody.1
Even the most inveterate developmental "optimists," however,
reject such austere "realism" for the future. They opt mostly
for sustainability either as an unavoidable natural replenishing
or as a result of human technical fixes. 19s Sustainability seems
what most legal and institutional proposals, whatever their theoretical origins, seek to attain. 199
Command regulations certainly are intended to accomplish
sustainability of flow resources. For too long groundwater has
been treated as outside either regulation or, in much of the
world, outside of a specific property rights system. A scarce
resource which increasingly is losing even the vaguest appearance
of something rightfully carrying a zero price has been priced as
2
if it were a free good. 00
Maybe those who see the market in groundwater as a potentially "positive-sum situation," where voluntary exchanges encourage the better use of resources, are correct. 20 1 The traditional
methods of providing water through publicly financed projects
that make the water available for a charge greatly below cost or
by self-suppliers who pump from allegedly free aquifers are in
trouble. Budgets for those projects have been cut. The demand
stimulated in this fashion has led to increasingly unavailable
water resources. Public opposition is increasing to a provision
of "free" water that exploits the environmental or to a subsidized water that exploits the general taxpayer for an individual

"97

98

Beckerman, supra note 196, at 22.

G. O'NEILL, 2081: A Hopeful View of the Human Future 84-85, 238-39 (1981).

H. KAHN, W. BROWN, & L. MARTEL (with the Hudson Institute) THE NEXT 200
YEARS: A SCENARIO FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD, 8, 26-27 (1976). See also, H. KAHN,
THE COMING BooM: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL (1982).
Zo REPETTO, supra note 35, at 59.
o Id. at 9.
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water user's private advantage. 20 2 The reasons for public opposition range from the fiscal, to the environmental, to the aesthetic, and, "as a result, the marketing and transfer of water as
a commodity is fast becoming the main source of water for

growth.'

'203

The role of government, if and when groundwater and other
waters are commoditized, remains strong. That sovereign role
includes providing information; educating the public; monitoring
the groundwater resource; creating a legal and institutional
framework for bulk sale of water and trading in aquifer access
rights; and conducting research to improve engineering efficiency
and the frugality of the agroindustrial use of groundwater. Other
sovereign services must also be furnished that will be difficult
or impossible to internalize into the market price for individual
property rights in groundwater. 204

The sovereign possibly will be required to do still more. Even
a strong advocate of the market, Orlando Delogu, can claim
that "[flinally, [the] government at every level must continue to
provide, or at least to assist in the provision of, the infrastructure
needs, (i.e., roads, water projects, energy supplies), upon which
the farm sector as well as other segments of the society de-

pends. "205
Therefore, it is most likely that neither a system of command
regulations issued by the sovereign nor a system of fixed units

discussion about water in terms of market failures, the cost of
22 An excellent
government interventions, and general dissatisfaction with the current operations of
American water use is in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 42-78 (J.
Laitos ed. 1985).
Brochure, UNIVERSrrY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW'S NATURAL RESOURCES PRO'0'

GRAM AND WATERSHED WEST, WATER MARKETMNG: OPPORTUNrrIES AND CHALLENGES OF

NEW ERA, (Brochure dated Sept. 24-26, 1986) (The periodical, Water Market Update,
dealing with sales of water rights in appropriation jurisdictions, began publication in
January, 1987.).
114 REPETTO, supra note 35, at 9-10. Repetto is pleased that Exclusive Economic
Zones have brought forty percent of the ocean within their jurisdiction by national
proclamations and the Law of the Sea Convention; but he laments that inadequate
governmental resources in capital, personnel, and administrative capacity will prevent a
private property system from operating efficiently within these zones. Id. at 116. (This
underscores the importance of government in any private property regime over flow
resources.).
'i Delogu, supra note 148, at 536 (Foomote omitted). Water projects often meet
the required cost-benefit ratio by the sale of hydropower.
A
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of independent private property, acting alone, can sustain a
resource such as groundwater. Even under a private property
system of the most intensely individual kind, the sovereign has
non-delegable duties to perform. 2°6 Otherwise the individual
property units will lose their value because they will have lost
their security. Even a sovereign rejecting private property, given
the sophisticated demands of urban-technology in both developed and developing countries, cannot leave renewable phenomena today in nature as an amorphous part of the sovereign's
inchoate self.
Rather, the sovereign must specify economically-significant
natural phenomena as natural resources to be administered for
human use. The sovereign must act in this specific way if its
command regulations are to operate effectively. Beyond this
specification, the sovereign needs identifiable units of property,
just as the holders of those units need sovereign activity, if
renewable resources such as groundwater are to continue their
renewability.
The holders of those units of property may be individual
human beings, corporations controlling private capital, or instrumentalities of the sovereign. This specification is an effective
means of locating a natural phenomenon as a human resource,
identifying a property right in the resource, and commoditizing
that property right in the market. As a result, the sustainability
of the renewable resource will be supported by advantaging
20 7
whomever may be the holder of this unit of property.
Sustainability of groundwater of potable quality or, at least,
of quality no worse than nature provided, should be the purpose
of every contemporary legal system. In this regard, the water

In English legal history from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, this is
what is meant by the statement that "property was always discussed in the political
context of authority and liberty." J. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS
ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HIsTORY CHIEFLY IN Ta EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 70-71 (1985)

(footnote omitted).
I These ideas concerning the importance of resource specificity follow CIRIAcYWANTRUP, supra note 107, at 216-21, as well as CmuLcY-WANuTRp, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: EcoNoMcs AND POLICIES (3rd ed. 1968). The ideas concerning the function of
property are indebted to Jacob H. Beuscher. See F. Thomas, Law in Action: Legal
Frontiersfor Natural Resources Planning: The Work of Professor Jacob H. Beuscher,
LAND ECONOnCS MoNoGR"H no. 4, 26-30 (1972).
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confined in replenishing aquifers simply is paradigmatic of all
renewable resources. Aquifers, too, now require human assistance to sustain their renewability as a result of human demand
upon their powers of self-sustenance. If some kind of human
help is not forthcoming, aquifers are at risk to irreversible pollution or exhaustion. The danger is similar to the risks of any
renewable resource impacted by the massive demands of the
human economy and technology.
VIII.

SOME DECISIONS ABOUT WHAT

To Do

The groundwater resource is adversely affected today both
as to its quantity and quality. Quantity problems are not universal to all regions; but since the mid-1940s well construction
and extraction have increased and produced overdrafts-and
actual mining-of groundwater in many areas of the United
States. The aim of wise persons pumping groundwater should
be sustained yield from aquifers in order to avoid the difficulities
that overpumping can cause and the possible disaster of aquifer
destruction. In order to do so, conjunctive water planning 2 8 that
would treat surface and groundwater as two interrelated resources should be inaugurated. Once such a conjunction has
been established, surface water that would have been lost to
high evapotranspiration or flooding could be used to augment
2 9
groundwater stocks. 0
Where groundwater quality currently is concerned, there is
a perception of severe risks threatening the resource. In an

See Carpenter, Conjunctive Use in the Sevier River System, 113 J. OF

IRRIGATION

AND DRAINAGE ENGINEERING, (1987).
209 HIGH PLAINS ASSOCIATES:

CAMP DRESSER & McKEE,

INC.,

BLACK &

VEATCH,

ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., SIX-STATE HIGH PLAINS-OGALLALA AQUIFER REGIONAL RESOURCES STUDY - FINAL REPORT, REGIONAL STUDY ELEMENT B-5, LOCAL WATER SUPPLY
AUGMENTATION ASSESSMENT (July 1982). The study considers "weather

modification;

snow pack management; water harvesting and catchment areas; noncultivated area
treatments, such as pitting, chiseling, water spreading, diversions, and vegetative management to increase infiltration and reduce runoff; cultivated area treatments, such as
deep plowing, clay pan control, terracing, benching, leveling, basin tillage, runoff
recovery, and soil conditioning; management and control of noxious, deep rooted wood
perennials, and phreatophytes; reestablishment of native grasslands; direct use of brack-

ish or saline waters; blending with [non-saline groundwater]; desalination; . . . secondary
recovery of capillary/molecular waters; transfer of groundwater use rights; and evapotranspiration management and reduction" (report summary). Id.
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industrial state like Ohio, 20,000 leaks from underground storage
tanks were occurring in the summer of 1988 and, while 100,000
tanks in the state were under regulation, thousands of other
tanks were unregulated, many of them known to only a very
few people.210 Government has not been indifferent to this or
other kinds of pollution sources threatening the groundwater
resource. Out of the fifty states, District of Columbia, and six
territories, forty-six have implemented programs to control discharges of groundwater.2 1 Unfortunately, current studies show
little coordination of the relationship between groundwater quality protection programs and groundwater diversion programs,
while the quality protection programs themselves have been called
"highly variable.

2E
12

Even as the risks have become more evi-

dent, actions have not uniformly dealt with them, as is made
clear when one state in 1988 has as few as fourteen potential
contaminants listed while another has as many as 190.213
What more then ought to be done, in addition to the conjunctive planning called for above, and what likely will be done
in order to protect groundwater quality and to encourage the
maintenance of sustainable yields?

(1) The prevention of pollution of groundwater from underground storage tanks, injection wells, and mineral extraction
industries such as oil and gas, aggregates, and coal is needed.
These may pose no greater risks than landfills, industrial surface
waste storage, or the transit of hazardous materials; but they
often represent a more continuous operation, may be harder
simply to close down or order into a temporary cessation of
activities, and may have greater economic impact in their function.
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OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL

20,000

LEAKS UNDER OHIO: ENVIRONMENTAL AND

HEALTH THREATS FROM LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS IN OHIo (August 1988).
2 Goldfarb, State Groundwater Quality Protection Activities, 24 WATER RE-

SOURCES BULL. 697 (1988) (discussing UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GROUNDWATER QUALITY: STATE ACTIVITIES TO GUARD AGAINST CONTAMINANTS (GAO/

PEMD-88-5)).
Id. at 698.
2,3Id. at 697.
Ohio Ground
z,,The Ohio Water Protection Implementation Matrix, Part III,
Water Protection and Management Strategy (July 5, 1988 update) sets forth the different
approaches that the state will take concerning these different activities. This is an example
of what one industrial state plans to do.
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(2) The protection of groundwater is essential from the incursion of dispersed surface chemicals such as fertilizers, pesticides, plant growth inhibitors, and other applications particularly
associated with agriculture. Iowa, for example, has undertaken
a study to set standards for "synthetic organic compounds"
used in agriculture, 215 while Nebraska has provided steps to
prevent nitrogen infiltration into groundwater in quantities dangerous to the human food chain. 216 Legislative actions of this
kind can be expected to increase since farmers can scarcely claim
to be unaware of the risks to groundwater posed by their modern
agricultural operations.
(3) Critical groundwater areas must be identified where extraction stresses an aquifer or some pollution source is threatening to damage groundwater. 217 Unfortunately, although twothirds of the states in 1988 had implemented aquifer mapping
programs, "only 12 possessed effective sole-source aquifer programs under the Safe Drinking Water Act. ' 21 8 And one must
bear in mind that implementing a program is not the equivalent
of providing adequate protection to an aquifer.
(4) More information about all groundwater, not merely
what is contained in a threatened aquifer, needs to be gathered.
With over fifty percent of the population of the United States
getting its drinking water from groundwater, that fact is reason

215

Killorn, Iowa's 1987 GroundwaterProtection Act, in

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH

N. CENTRAL EXTENSION-INDUSTRY SOIL FERTILITY WORKSHOP 84 (St. Louis, Mo., October

28-29, 1987) (Potash and Phosphate Institute 1987) (these standards are to be in place
by 1989).
216 Hergert, Water Quality Issues in Nebraska, in PROCEEDING OF THE 17TH N.
CENTRAL EXTENSION-INDUSTRY Son, FERTILITY WORKSHOP 88, 91 (1987). These phases
are to be applied in previously determined Special Groundwater Protection Areas. Under
the Nebraska Program's Phase 1, Nebraska will ban fall and winter application of
commercial nitrogen fertilizer on sandy soils if the nitrogen/nitrate concentration in
groundwater ranges from zero to 12.5 ppm; in Phase 2, the farmer must attend nitrogen
management seminars, analyze the water, apply nitrogen on fine textured soils only after
November 1 or when soil temperature is 50 degrees F. or cooler if the groundwater
analyzes between 12.6 and 20 ppm of nitrate; and in Phase 3, when nitrate levels have
exceeded 20.1 ppm, all application of nitrogen fertilizers is banned on all soils.
217 Noonan,
Rosenberg, & Wood, Constraints to Managing an Interstate Aquifer,
110 JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 191 (1984).
2I

Goldfarb, supra note 211, at 697.
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enough alone to learn about groundwater's location, movement,
replenishment, quality, volume, and other properties. 1 9
(5) The physical removal of groundwater, like the physical
removal of stream water, needs to be done with consideration
of how consumptive the use will be and how much of the water
extracted eventually will find its way back into some aquifer,
even if not the aquifer of the extracted water's origin. 22° This
would require a regulatory scheme, perhaps under the public
trust doctrine or perhaps simply under the traditional police
power, that would require variations in the rate of allowed
pumping, in the maintenance of prescribed water tables, in the
retention of a minimum content, and in the return or substituted
flow of at least a portion of what has been extracted. 22'
(6) Efforts should be made to specify the groundwater resources's particular use, whether it be as recipient of injected
liquids, as the object of dewatering in some mining operation,
as a source of water for irrigation, industrial cooling, or drinking
water, or in relation to some other human purpose. Having done
this, efforts should be made to identify the particular beneficiaries of these usages and the degree to which they depend upon
some aspect of groundwater for their benefits. The traditional
failure to establish these specifications and identifications has
resources
led to the wastage and abuse of groundwater and other
222
that seemingly are there for some "free" taking.
(7) The decision should be reached about continuing with a
method base entirely upon command regulation which is intended to allocate, augment, or protect the groundwater resource
or of going to a system having individual property rights for
groundwater while it is in the aquifer. Perhaps the Nobel Laureate in Economics, James Buchanan, is right. He wants to

2'9 For one example of a popular brochure on these needs, see OHIo EPA, GROUNDWATER 1 (987) (the dependence of Americans for drinking water on groundwater). For
Ohio's groundwater strategy, see Id. at 15-16.
'
Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 407 (1987).
-- Id., at 431-33, 435-37. Professor Ausness makes it clear at the beginning of his
article that measures employable for protecting surface streams can also be employed
for the protection of aquifers.
222 Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property Rights
Evolve, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 377 (1987).
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eliminate the traditional regulatory approach, which he calls
"social engineering," so that a system of endowments, claims,
rights, or characteristics in individuals can be established over
what otherwise would be natural elements simply regulated by
government. 223 In this way, what he calls "the spontaneous order
of the market" would arise and control for sustained yield the
exploitation of such resources. 224 Maybe this proposal for innovation is mistaken and we ought to opt for a stringent system
of standards vigorously enforced. 225 Perhaps environmentally

sensitive life styles can and should be coerced 226 or maybe, as
James Buchanan urges, every element of the pain/pleasure calculus ought to be dumped from public regulation of the economy. 22 7 The point is that the time is. ripe for trying out the
privatization of groundwater in the aquifer in order to learn
how many good results-if any-will be produced.
This paper has been an effort to briefly survey both the
current problems of the groundwater resource and some proposals for providing sustainable yield, protecting quality, preventing surface subsidence, and even interdicting pumping from
some groundwater sources. This author thinks subsidization of
groundwater usage at free or cheap prices should stop and
believes that it is politically possible to at least curtail such
subsidization. After all, in the United States between 1980 and
1985, water usage declined ten percent as water went up in price,
as pumping costs rose, and as aquifers were drawn down-and
this does not take into consideration the decline in water usage

M

J.

BUCHANAN, LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN T=E 1980s

264-66, 268-69 (1986).
_
Id. at 88. Buchanan is not an anarchist nor one who believes markets can
operate at a sophisticated level without government. Laws and institutions are essential.
Id. at 269.
2 Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and 'Fine-tuning' Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, at 1301-04
(1985).

Brooks, Coercion to Environmental Virtue: Can and Should Law Mandate
Environmentally Sensitive Life Styles?, 31 AM. J. JuRis. 21, 61 (1986).
27 BucHANAN, supra note 223, 262-64. He argues that it is not simply impossible
to compare different individual's concepts of utility but that it is impossible to define

even one individual's concept of utility.
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caused by the drought of 1988.228 This author does not believe,
however, that charges to be paid for groundwater by landowners
withdrawing it from under their own soil are politically likely,
regardless of the sort of fund into which the money would be
paid. What this paper has sought to do above all, however, is
to push decisionmakers in the direction of further action about
groundwater protection than current events seem likely to produce soon. If many people keep an attitude of indifference
toward the groundwater resource or follow only traditional institutional methods relative to the groundwater resource, then
groundwater will continue to be misused, wasted, and occasionally irretrievably destroyed as a renewable resource, with consequent regional declines in food production, a slowing of general
economic growth, disappointments in aspiration for rising living
229
standards, and local political instability.
This sounds dramatic. But so pervasive is the relationship of
groundwater to present and potential human demands upon it,
that such a statment is not dramatic at all-only realistic. If this
paper has succeeded in conveying the perceptions of danger and
of likely success in avoiding such danger, then the paper has
succeeded.

22 U.S. Geological Survey, Eighth Analysis, Nat'l Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 1988, at 12, col. 3. Between 1950 and 1980, however, water use had doubled, with
harmful consequences to the levels of water tables, groundwater quality, and aquifer
replenishment. Id. at col. 4.

9 Ensminger, Agriculture, Food, and Employment, 38 KIDMA, TIE ISRAEL JOURNAL
OF DEVELOPMENT 2, 19, 23 (1988).

